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Overview 
Student loans have helped millions of Australians finance their 
higher education since the Government introduced the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme, HECS, in 1989. The successor 
to HECS — the Higher Education Loan Program, HELP — lends 
more than $6 billion a year. It has been a very effective policy. But 
it has become expensive. By 2017 the Commonwealth will have 
$13 billion of loans on its books that it does not expect to collect.  
Students and former students repay their education debt only if 
they earn more than a threshold amount — currently $51,309 a 
year. Income contingent loans cleverly help cash-poor students 
pay for their education when they can afford to do so. Some of 
them never earn enough in Australia to repay what they borrowed.  
About 17 per cent of new lending is now classified as doubtful, 
meaning it is not expected to ever be fully repaid. This expense, 
which appears each year in the Commonwealth Budget, is 
projected to be $1.1 billion this financial year. With student 
numbers rapidly increasing, and new uses being found for income 
contingent loans, doubtful debt costs will continue to rise.  
This report investigates several ways of reducing doubtful debt 
while still protecting against financial hardship.  
One reason for doubtful debt is that HELP debtors leave Australia. 
Because HELP is repaid through the Australian income tax 
system it is not collected from people living elsewhere. England 
and New Zealand have similar student loan schemes and both 
require debtors in other countries to pay. This report recommends 
the New Zealand policy of requiring a flat annual repayment from 
student loan debtors living overseas.  
For debtors staying in Australia, some never earn more than the 
income threshold or do so for too few years to repay all their debt. 
Because the threshold is linked to average weekly earnings, it is 
increasing in real terms. Over time, this means that fewer debtors 
are obliged to repay. Linking the threshold to inflation would 
maintain its real value while increasing future repayment levels.  
Although  these  reforms  would  reduce  HELP’s  costs,  on  their  own  
their effect on doubtful debt is modest. Its main cause is that 
HELP debt in deceased estates is written off. This is not a good 
use of scarce higher education funding.  
Most beneficiaries of the HELP write-off will not be financially 
dependent on the HELP debtor. Partnered HELP debtors earning 
less  than  the  threshold  are  not  usually  the  household’s  main  
income earner. Their children will be adults by the time the estate 
is distributed. Introducing asset contingent HELP repayment for 
estates  over  $100,000  would  radically  improve  HELP’s  finances. 
If all these reforms were implemented now, they would save $860 
million a year by 2016–17, and remove the need for planned cuts 
to teaching and research expenditure.  
HELP’s  repayment  system  was  never  designed  for  lending  on  the  
scale we see today. With the reforms in this report, we can 
achieve the goals of HELP at a much lower cost 
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1. Introduction
This report examines student loan doubtful debt. It focuses on 
higher education students who have borrowed under the Higher 
Education Loan Program, HELP, which finances courses and 
course-related costs, but the  report’s findings have broader 
implications.  
In recent years HELP has been extended to some vocational 
education courses. There are also active proposals to advance 
similar loans for student income support. 
In principle, greater use of income contingent loans is a good 
idea. These loans help students shift their education expenses to 
a later, more affluent, time in their lives. The risk of default and a 
tarnished credit record is largely removed by income contingent 
repayment. 
But in practice, income contingent loans are expanding with little 
public discussion of the money that will not be paid back. 
Although some unrepaid debt is an intended feature of income 
contingent loans, current levels are higher than necessary. 
HELP’s  policy  goals  can  be  achieved at lower cost to taxpayers. 
Chapter 2 explains the policy thinking behind HELP, and the 
trends in doubtful debt. It shows how doubtful debt makes the 
proposed new uses for income contingent loans less financially 
viable. 
Chapter 3 contains new research into which groups of graduates 
are at most risk of not fully repaying their HELP loans. Graduates 
of some disciplines have high expected doubtful debt levels. 
HELP doubtful debt is linked to broader issues of full-time 
workforce participation.  
Chapter 4 looks at one policy response to doubtful debt: changing 
the income threshold at which HELP debtors start repaying their 
debt.  
Chapter 5 considers ways of recovering money from HELP 
debtors who are living overseas. The most feasible method 
requires some departure from income contingent repayment.  
A lower real threshold and overseas repayment would increase 
government revenue by several hundred million dollars in the next 
few years. Most of this would be faster repayment of HELP debt 
that would eventually be repaid anyway, but there would be some 
reduction in doubtful debt.  
Chapter 6 re-evaluates the current practice of not collecting 
outstanding HELP debt from deceased estates. It argues that this 
is poorly targeted spending, and that vulnerable estate 
beneficiaries could be protected at much lower cost by requiring 
repayment from estates of $100,000 or more.  
As most HELP debtors are still young, this policy change would 
not raise significant revenues for many years. Yet it would have 
an immediate and large effect on HELP’s  Budget  costs.  This  is  
because provision is made for doubtful debt each year, as an 
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Grattan Institute 2014 6 
honest statement of how much each  year’s lending costs the 
government.   
Chapter 7 summarises the savings to be made from the proposed 
policy changes. Put together, the three reforms could reduce 
doubtful debt from 17 per cent of new lending in 2013–14 to 7 per 
cent of new lending in 2016-17.  
 
Figure 1: Reduction in doubtful debt from HELP reform 2016-17 
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2. Doubtful debt under HELP 
The Higher Education Loan Program, HELP, was never designed 
to recover all the money it lends to students. Loan eligibility is 
determined by course admissions, not by credit checks. Debtors 
do not repay if their income is below $51,309 or if they are 
overseas. And unlike almost all other debts, a HELP debt dies 
with the debtor.  
HELP started out as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, 
HECS, in 1989. Given the typical ages at which people attend 
university, most HELP debtors are less than 45 years old. With 
this relatively young population, final debt write-offs are not yet 
large. But a significant minority of students and former students 
are expected to never fully repay the money they borrowed. We 
call the money they owe ‘doubtful  debt’, and an allowance is 
made for it in every Commonwealth Budget. The amount exceeds 
a billion dollars a year, and is expected to grow significantly in 
coming years.  
Doubtful debt is an expected feature of HELP. This was partly a 
political concession: it helped the government reduce per-student 
public subsidies. Even with doubtful debt, the government was 
financially better off lending money rather than giving it away. It 
was also partly deliberate policy design. To support enrolment in 
higher education, the government was and is willing to take some 
of the risk that further study will not bring financial benefits.  
The policy question now is whether government is taking too 
much of this risk. HELP lending is vastly greater than was 
anticipated when its repayment system was designed in the late 
1980s. If Budget projections are correct, there will be nearly twice 
as many students eligible for a HECS-equivalent loan this year as 
there were in 1989. On average, these students borrow a lot more 
now than then. In  today’s  money,  students in 1989 paid about 
$3,500 a year for their higher education. Now they pay between 
$6,000 and $10,000 a year, depending on the subjects they take.  
As well as these increases, HELP is being used for new 
purposes. The descendant of the original HECS scheme, HECS-
HELP for government-supported university students, has been 
joined by FEE-HELP for full-fee students, SA-HELP for the 
student amenities fee, OS-HELP for overseas study, and 
VET FEE-HELP for vocational education students. Soon there 
may also be HELP-like schemes for student income support.  
Including all these new schemes, the government now lends as 
much through HELP — $6.3 billion in 2013-14 — as it spends on 
direct higher education tuition subsidies. In 2014–15, HELP 
lending will significantly exceed tuition subsidy expenditure. With 
so much lending, HELP repayment policies need re-examination.  
2.1 The purpose of HELP loans 
Around the world, government programs help students avoid 
paying up-front fees for higher education. These policies aim to 
help prospective higher education students overcome financial 
obstacles to study. The goals in Australia are similar to those in 
other countries: to provide a skilled workforce, to promote social 
mobility, to support personal development, and to pursue 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
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knowledge for its own sake.1 In Australia, public opinion 
overwhelmingly supports the proposition that cost should not 
prevent qualified students from attending university.2 
The two main types of government financial assistance for tuition 
costs are subsidies and loans. Although in the long run subsidised 
higher education can pay for itself through taxation on the higher 
incomes of graduates, at least in English-speaking countries the 
trend has been away from direct subsidies and towards loans. 
HECS was an early part of this trend, ending a period of free 
higher education that began in 1974.3  
HECS was introduced in part because the then government did 
not believe it could finance expanded higher education from its 
own resources alone.4 While in theory increased taxation could 
fund more higher education, in practice governments often find it 
politically difficult to increase tax rates or impose new taxes. Key 
ministers also believed that free higher education was regressive.5 
Higher education subsidies largely went to people from affluent 
families, and to people who would enjoy significantly above 
average incomes over their careers.6   
HECS partially reconceptualised the role of government in higher 
education. It assumed that students do not need a full subsidy, 
                                            
1 DEEWR (2009), p. 7 
2 McAllister (2008) 
3 Chapman and Nicholls (2013).  There  had  been  a  small  ‘Higher  Education 
Administration  Charge’  from  1986.   
4 Dawkins (1987), esp. chapter 11, and Wran (1988) 
5 Chapman and Nicholls (2013), p. 112 
6 See Norton (2012a) on the private benefits of higher education and Norton 
(2013b) p. 29-30 on the social background of higher education students.  
but that they do need to postpone payment. HECS shifted the 
cost of their education away from a cash-constrained time to a 
later period of relative affluence. It did so by not requiring 
repayment below a threshold income, and by charging lower rates 
of repayment for people earning slightly over the threshold 
compared to those on higher incomes.7  
Compared to up-front fees, HECS both gives more people an 
opportunity to study and spreads purchasing power more evenly 
over  a  person’s  life.  Typically,  it  means  that they can buy more 
when they are young but less at a later age when they are 
repaying their debt. The British economist Nicholas Barr describes 
these income smoothing activities as the welfare state acting as a 
‘piggy  bank’  to be drawn on and repaid over a life, rather than the 
welfare state working as a ‘Robin  Hood’,  distributing  income  from  
the rich to the poor.8  
Although  the  ‘piggy  bank’  activities  of  government  are  mostly  
about income smoothing, they also manage risk. This is one key 
difference between a private loan to finance higher education and 
a government-supported loan. Normal loan schedules require 
minimum repayments regardless of income. Graduates 
sometimes take time to find appropriate work, and so this type of 
debt creates a risk of default. In the United States, student debt 
defaults affect the creditworthiness of large numbers of people.9 
In Australia, this problem is rare.10 For most student debtors, low 
                                            
7 See ATO (2013e) for the repayment requirements at different levels of income. 
8 Barr (2001) 
9 Historically, at least 5 per cent of US student debtors default within 5 years. 
Recently the default rate has been 10 per cent; Turner (2013) 
10 Some people are unable to pay their tax liabilities, a problem to which HELP 
debt may contribute.  
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income relative to their education debt means repayment delay 
rather than default. 
One issue this report raises is whether making loans contingent 
on income is the principle behind HELP, or whether it is a 
mechanism  used  to  implement  HELP’s  income  smoothing  and  
risk management policy goals.11 As this report will show, strict 
application of income contingency as a principle undermines the 
original objective of HECS and HELP: to require those who can 
contribute to the cost of their education to do so. It substantially 
increases the public cost of higher education, but with few 
compensating public benefits. The lost money transfers wealth to 
people who would not, under normal social policy criteria, be 
eligible to receive it. In specific circumstances, income 
contingency can be supplemented with other repayment 
mechanisms to ensure that more people repay their student 
loans.  
2.2 Trends in HELP doubtful debt 
The level of HELP debt not expected to be repaid — what this 
report calls doubtful debt — is calculated each year by the 
Australian Government Actuary (AGA). Its work is based on data 
supplied by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).  
Predicting what will happen over a long time period is inherently 
difficult. Eventual HELP repayment rates will depend on the 
repayment rules and how personal circumstances mix with 
broader social and economic trends. Complicating matters further, 
                                            
11 See also Chapman (2006), especially chapter 3, on income smoothing and 
risk management.  
the ATO can only give the AGA a limited amount of information. 
Historical incomes, age and gender are used to predict likely 
repayments. Chapter 3, drawing on a wider range of data sources 
than the  AGA’s  HELP  analysis, unpacks some of the causes of 
doubtful debt.  
Using its model, the AGA predicts that $7.1 billion of the 
$30.1 billion outstanding HELP debt at 30 June 2013 will not be 
repaid.12 Accounting conventions require doubtful debt to be 
expensed annually: in other words, as an honest account of the 
true expenses incurred each year. In 2013–14, 17 per cent of new 
lending — or about $1.1 billion — is not expected to be repaid.13  
The amount of doubtful debt goes up every year, reflecting 
accumulating doubtful debt from earlier years and new lending 
(Figure 2). Assuming 17 per cent of new debt will not be repaid, in 
2017 doubtful debt will reach $13 billion, out of an estimated total 
$55 billion HELP debt.14  
                                            
12 DIICCSRTE (2013b), p. 245 
13 Communication from the Department of Education. For 2011-12, 8 per cent of 
borrowers were expected to make no repayment, and another 10 per cent to 
partially repay their debt.   
14 It is also possible for the stock of doubtful debt to be re-valued up or down, 
which will affect the level of doubtful debt on top of the influence of new lending.  
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Figure 2: HELP debt and debt not expected to be repaid, 1988–89 to 
2016–17 
 
Notes: Forecast of HELP debt is based on combining the CPI-indexed stock of HELP 
debt from last year with new lending and subtracting estimated annual 
repayments. Doubtful debt estimates are only available from 1992-93 onwards. 
Sources: DIICCSRTE (2013a); c); DIISRTE (various years); Communication from the 
Department of Education 
Although the total amount not expected to be repaid goes up 
every year, its percentage of the outstanding total varies. Over 
time, it has fluctuated between 14 and 23 per cent, its level in 
2012-13.15 This is higher than the 17 per cent of new debt that is 
                                            
15 DIISRTE (2012b), p. 39 
doubtful.  This  is  because  ‘old’  doubtful  debt  builds  up  over  time.  
For example, in 2010 the ATO reported that nearly $500 million 
was still owed by 56,000 people who incurred a HECS debt in 
1989, long after everyone else at university that year had repaid.16 
Estimates from 2012 are that more than a quarter of all remaining 
HELP debtors will not fully repay what they owe. This is made up 
of 16.5 per cent who are not expected to repay anything, and 
another 11 per cent who are expected to repay only part of their 
debt.17 The remaining debtors are expected to repay in full.  
2.3 Budget pressures 
HELP doubtful debt is increasing at a time when the 
Commonwealth Budget is under significant pressure.18 As a 
result, higher education is targeted frequently for cuts, with new 
expenditure reductions announced in April 2013.19 In the latest 
Budget savings, the Commonwealth plans to reduce previously 
legislated increases in funding for teaching and research. These 
cuts affect the core activities of universities. 
Minor savings from the HELP scheme have been included in 
these cutbacks.20 Little has been done about doubtful debt, the 
                                            
16 ATO (2012), table 19 
17 For the year ending 30 June 2011, Communication from the Department of 
Education.  
18 Daley, et al. (2013) 
19 Emerson (2013) 
20 These include reductions in the discount for up-front payment of student 
contributions from 20 per cent in 2011 to 10 per cent in 2012. In the April 2013 
package an abolition of the discount was announced, but it has not yet been 
legislated. The savings from this change will be reduced by increased doubtful 
debt  through  more  lending.  A  ‘bonus’  for  repaying  early  was  reduced  from  10  per  
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biggest current HELP cost. Leaving doubtful debt out of higher 
education expenditure control shows questionable priorities. 
Lower debt costs could free up money for teaching and research. 
Not tackling doubtful debt also creates additional fiscal concern 
about expanding HELP. Its use for additional student income 
support has been proposed many times.21 Two specific schemes 
have realistic prospects of becoming law. The previous 
government announced, but did not legislate, conversion of the 
current Student Start-Up Scholarship to a loan.22 The new 
Coalition government is attempting to proceed with this change. 
However, this scheme does not provide students with any more 
money than they would otherwise receive under Youth Allowance. 
During the 2013 election campaign, the Coalition promised a 
HELP-like  ‘Trade  Support  Loan’  of up to $20,000 to finance 
“everyday  costs”  for  apprentices  in  vocational education 
Certificate III and IV courses.23 This would be a new entitlement.  
An income support loan could allow students to improve their 
living standards and/or to work less while studying. Both England 
and New Zealand include income support in their student loan 
schemes. About half of full-time Australian undergraduates say 
their work commitments adversely affect their performance at 
                                                                                    
cent in 2011 to 5 per cent in 2012, with its completion abolition announced but 
not legislated. 
21 Higgins (2011) 
22 Emerson (2013) 
23 Liberal/National (2013), p. 4-7 
university.24 A majority say they would be likely to use a loan for 
living costs.25 In the case of apprentices, the Coalition’s  policy 
aims to reduce the number of people leaving for higher-paying 
jobs before finishing their apprenticeship.  
Despite the policy attractions of loans for student income support, 
previous experience suggests that people who borrow for income 
support are higher risk than people who borrow to pay tuition fees. 
Doubtful debts were estimated at 50 per cent for the Student 
Financial Supplement Scheme, a loan scheme for people on 
student income support that ran for a decade from 1993.26  
The debt write-off also raises questions about proposals that the 
Commonwealth increase the maximum contributions paid by 
Commonwealth-supported students (those receiving tuition 
subsidies and HECS-HELP loans). Some universities argue that 
such a change would ease their financial problems and finance 
improvements in teaching. While these are worthwhile goals, the 
existing maximum student contributions limit potential HELP 
doubtful debt.  Unless  HELP’s  costs  are  controlled, any increase in 
student contributions will be partly funded by taxpayers.  
The  Coalition’s  proposed  Trade Support Loan scheme for 
apprentices is the latest extension of income contingent loans into 
vocational education. Since 2009, some students in diploma-level 
vocational education courses have had access to VET FEE-HELP 
                                            
24 Bexley, et al. (2013), p. 51. However, research into whether or not paid work 
negatively affects academic performance is more sceptical: e.g. Coates and 
Edwards (2009), p. 99.  
25 Bexley, et al. (2013), p. 42 
26 Higgins (2011), p. 471. Of the remaining SFSS debt, 63 per cent is classed as 
doubtful: DIICCSRTE (2013b), p. 245. 
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loans. A VET FEE-HELP trial is underway for select certificate IV 
courses.27 In principle the arguments for income contingent loans 
are the same in vocational or higher education. However, the 
repayment system was designed for university graduates. The 
lower typical incomes of people with vocational qualifications may 
exacerbate doubtful debt issues, as section 3.5 discusses.  
  
                                            
27 Department of Education (2014) 
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3. Why is so much HELP debt doubtful?
There are no official accounts that explain why so much HELP 
debt is doubtful. Given the limited information the ATO collects, 
tax statistics alone paint only part of the picture. In this chapter, 
we use other data sources to help explain why some people 
persistently earn less than the HELP repayment threshold.  
3.1 Differences in income between disciplines 
Graduate earnings differ by discipline.28 Since HELP debtors only 
repay if their income reaches the threshold, graduates of some 
disciplines are more likely than others to repay their debt. Figure 3 
is based on earnings patterns evident in the 2011 Census. It 
shows what proportion of bachelor degree graduates with no 
further higher education are likely to repay their debt and at what 
level.29 The proportion of these graduates who are not expected 
to fully repay ranges from 5 per cent in medicine to 55 per cent in 
visual arts and crafts.  
                                            
28 Daly, et al. (2012); Weidmann and Norton (2012a)  
29 Due to a data restriction, we are unable to exclude graduates who do not have 
outstanding HELP debt from the sample. Upfront payments differ by discipline, 
usually but not always reinforcing the Census patterns of predicted payment: 
Wiblin (2011), p. 35. 
Figure 3: Proportion of bachelor degree graduates by their 
expected repayment level, 2011 
 
Notes: Based on the analysis of Weidmann and Norton (2012a) updated with Census 
2011 data. The student contribution for science (excl. maths) and mathematical 
sciences courses reflects the current contribution level, not the lower level for 
2011. Health (other) includes health fields other than medicine, dentistry and 
nursing. Graduates aged 18-65 who are also Australian citizens are included. 
People who did not specify their income are excluded. The 2010-11 threshold 
was used.  
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
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Figure 4, by contrast, shows what proportion of male and female 
bachelor-degree only graduates are expected to repay their debt. 
The effect of course studied on repayment remains roughly the 
same for men and women, but overall women are less likely to 
repay.  
Large disciplines with lower repayment prospects are the main 
contributors to doubtful debt. Although performing arts and visual 
arts and crafts have a higher proportion of non-repaying 
graduates, commerce, education, nursing, science and 
humanities are the main contributors to doubtful debt once their 
larger number of graduates is accounted for. Figure 5 shows the 
number of graduates by their predicted level of repayment for 
each discipline. 
Women tend to be over-represented in disciplines with low 
repayment prospects. The proportion of female graduates ranges 
from 61 per cent of graduates in humanities to 92 per cent in 
nursing.30 There are equal numbers of men and women in 
commerce. Some of the reasons for women’s  lower repayment 
prospects are discussed in the next section.  
 
                                            
30 ABS (2011) 
Figure 4: Proportion of bachelor degree graduates by repayment 
level, 2011  
 
Note: See notes for Figure 3. 
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
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Figure 5: Number of bachelor degree graduates by their expected 
repayment level, 2011 
 
Note: The number of graduates shown is an approximation of the actual number since 
not all graduates respond to the Census question on education. See also the 
notes for Figure 3. 
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
3.2 Women’s  labour  force  participation 
Since 1987 women have made up the majority of higher 
education students.31 Women’s  earnings  therefore  significantly  
affect HELP’s  finances. At a given point in time, women are more 
than twice as likely as men to earn income below the HELP 
repayment threshold, as Figure 6 shows. At the minimum, this 
affects the speed at which women repay compared to men.32 
For the purpose of estimating doubtful debt, what matters most is 
for how long women’s  incomes  are  above  or  below  the  threshold  
for repayment. If their income exceeds the threshold for a 
sufficient number of years — 10 to 15 years for a median 
graduate — they will repay their loan in full. If their income is 
below the threshold in all or most years of their working lives, their 
HELP debt will eventually be written off.  
However, the snapshot in time shown in Figure 6 can over-
emphasise temporary factors affecting graduates. A longitudinal 
survey that records income data from the same individual over 
time provides a more realistic picture of long-term prospects. The 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey 
(HILDA) shows that women are much more likely than men to 
persistently earn incomes that are below the HELP threshold.  
 
                                            
31 Norton (2013b), p. 28 
32 See also Higgins and Sinning (2013) on gender differences in repayment 
times and prospects.  
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
Me
dic
ine
 
De
nti
str
y 
La
w 
En
gin
ee
rin
g 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 Te
ch
no
log
y 
Co
mm
erc
e 
Ma
the
ma
tic
al 
Sc
ien
ce
s 
Nu
rsi
ng
 
Ar
ch
ite
ctu
re 
Sc
ien
ce
 (e
xc
l. m
ath
s) 
He
alt
h (
oth
er)
 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
 
Hu
ma
nit
ies
 
Pe
rfo
rm
ing
 Ar
ts 
Vis
ua
l A
rts
 an
d C
raf
ts 
Number of graduates (‘000) 
Full repayment 
Partial 
repayment No repayment 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 16 
Figure 6: Proportion of higher education graduates with earnings 
below the threshold, 2011 
 
Notes: The Census income data is presented in ranges. Uniform distribution is assumed 
within each income range to determine the number of people with income above 
the threshold within the range $41,600–51,999. The data includes postgraduate, 
bachelor, graduate diploma and diploma certificate graduates who were 
Australian citizens in 2011, not just those with HELP debt. It excludes graduates 
below 24 or above 54 years old and people are still studying. The 2010-11 
threshold is used. 
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
Figure 7 shows that over the 11 years covered by the survey, 34 
per cent of women but only 7 per cent of men spent six or more 
years earning less than the threshold income. In addition, the 
majority of men earned income above the threshold for the entire 
11 years, but only 30 per cent of women did so.  
Figure 7: Proportion of higher education graduates by number of 
years of below the repayment threshold income, 2001–2011 
 
Notes: The data includes postgraduate, bachelor, graduate diploma and graduate 
certificate graduates who were Australian citizens in 2011. It excludes graduates 
below 24 or above 54 years old and people who are still studying. 
Source: HILDA (2011) 
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Graduates in full-time work are likely to make repayments. About 
75 per cent of full-time jobs pay more than the threshold.33 
Graduates are less likely than non-graduates to be in the lower-
skill jobs that pay below the threshold, so the proportion of full-
time jobs that pay more than the threshold would be higher for 
graduates.34  
The main reason female debtors do not repay their HELP debt is 
that they are less likely than male graduates to work full time, as 
Figure 8 shows. Female graduate full-time work rates peak at 72 
per cent in the 20 to 24-year old age group. They then decline to 
40 per cent in the 35 to 39-year old age group, before recovering 
for 15 years. After age 54 a phase-down to retirement occurs. By 
contrast, the majority of male graduates work full-time, except in 
the 60 to 64-year old age group.  
Women with child-raising responsibilities are much less likely to 
work full-time. Figure 9 shows the full-time workforce rates of 
female higher education graduates in different household 
situations. For women with children, full-time work rates peak in 
their early 50s, when their children are adult or no longer need 
supervision. Single women with children consistently have higher 
full-time participation rates than married women with children.  
                                            
33 Adult full time jobs, ABS (2013d) 
34 ABS (2013c) 
Figure 8: Full-time labour force participation, male and female 
higher education degree holders, 2011 
 
Notes: The data includes postgraduate, bachelor, graduate diploma and graduate 
certificate graduates who were Australian citizens in 2011. It excludes graduates 
below 20 or above 65 years old and people who are still studying. 
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
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at a higher rate than do single women, possibly because they can 
maintain their living standards by sharing their partners’ income. 
Perhaps consistent with a pattern of partners sharing finances, 
married male graduates have higher rates of full-time work than 
do their single peers.35  
Long-term projections of HELP doubtful debt are sensitive to 
female employment patterns. An increase in female full-time 
workforce participation would reduce doubtful debt. Conversely, 
since less than 20 per cent of part-time jobs pay above the 
threshold, a decrease in female full-time workforce participation 
would increase doubtful debt. A comparison of the 2006 and 2011 
census indicates that female graduates aged 20 to 64 have 
reduced their full-time participation rate from 52 to 50 per cent.36 
As the trend is likely to continue, doubtful debt will increase in the 
future.37 Workforce participation is outside the scope of this report, 
but policies that affect it could have significant effects on the long-
term cost of HELP.38 
                                            
35 ABS (2011) 
36 Male graduate full-time workforce participation also declined by a percentage 
point. The patterns show that young graduates are finding it harder to find full-
time work, but women are more affected than men. Women returning to the 
workforce in their thirties and forties are less likely to work full-time in 2011 
compared to 2006. Men never exited and are maintaining full-time work rates. 
Full-time workforce participation is increasing for men and women aged over 50 
years: ABS (2006); ABS (2011).  
37 Borland (2013) 
38 See Daley (2012), chapter 4 
Figure 9: Full-time labour force participation, female higher 
education graduates, household circumstances 2011 
 
Notes:  The data includes postgraduate, bachelor, graduate diploma and graduate 
certificate graduates who were Australian citizens in 2011, not just those with 
HELP debt. Social marital status is used which includes married in a registered 
marriage and married in a de facto marriage. It excludes people who are 
studying. 
Source:  ABS, Census 2011 
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3.3 Incomplete higher education 
Not everyone who starts a higher education course finishes it. 
Completion rates are not routinely published, but the available 
information suggests that 20 to 25 per cent of people who started 
an undergraduate course in 2005 never received a qualification.39 
This means that significant numbers of people acquire HELP debt 
without getting a degree. 
Data limitations make it difficult to work out how much doubtful 
debt is due to people with incomplete qualifications. People with 
incomplete courses will leave higher education with lower average 
debt than people who finish their studies. Some people will have 
borrowed for only one semester, but others may have years of 
accumulated HELP debt.  
Our ability to predict repayment rates for university dropouts is 
restricted by limited research into their long-term financial 
outcomes.40 If dropouts earn as much as people with Year 12 
education only, Census 2011 data shows that about half of men 
but only 30 per cent of women aged 25 to 45 had incomes above 
the HELP repayment threshold. However, this is likely to 
understate dropouts’  income prospects. People who do not 
complete are disproportionately from those with weaker school 
results, but their results still suggest higher academic ability than 
                                            
39 Lomax-Smith, et al. (2011), p. 79 
40 Compared to people who finished school but had no further qualifications 
Marks (2007) found no financial benefit from incomplete higher education using 
a small Australian sample of people who were still young. An English study 
found no benefit: Walker and Zhu (2013). However, an American study found 
some benefit from incomplete college education: Greenstone and Looney 
(2013). 
school leavers who never went to university.41 This prior ability 
may be reflected in subsequent earnings. It is possible that people 
who leave university before finishing their course nevertheless 
acquire skills that are valuable in the labour market. They may 
also have or acquire other qualifications that improve their 
earnings prospects. Some higher education applicants already 
have a vocational education qualification.42 An old research paper 
reported that about one-third of young people who left higher 
education went to vocational education.43  
No precision is possible, but university dropouts probably earn 
more than people with no post-school study, but significantly less 
than people who complete their qualifications. Due to their lower 
average original debt, dropouts need fewer years of above-
threshold income to completely repay their HELP debts. However, 
they are likely to be over-represented in HELP debtors who are 
not expected to repay.  
3.4 Moving overseas  
People who leave Australia for an extended period are generally 
not required to pay tax in Australia.44 HELP debt is recovered by 
the ATO through the Australian tax system. As the ATO has no 
international jurisdiction, repayments from overseas debtors are 
not collected and their outstanding debt will not be recovered 
unless they return to Australia.  
                                            
41 On the link between Australian Tertiary Admission Rank and attrition see 
Norton (2013a), p. 7 
42 Department of Education (2013c) 
43 McMillan (2005), p. 14 
44 ATO (2011) 
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Unfortunately there are no reliable statistics on HELP debtors 
living overseas. In 2010–11 the ATO reported 32,365 HELP 
debtors with unknown or overseas addresses, or two per cent of 
the total outstanding HELP debtors.45 However, that understates 
the true number. HELP debtors are not obliged to report foreign 
addresses, and other sources suggest that the number is higher. 
Australian National University economists Bruce Chapman and 
Tim Higgins used the Beyond Graduation Survey to determine the 
proportion of graduates working overseas. They estimated that 10 
per cent of graduates work overseas for at least one year in the 
first 3.5 years after graduation. Of these, they estimated that 76 
per cent spend fewer than five years abroad before returning to 
Australia.46 With domestic student course completions 
approaching 200,000 a year and a growing proportion of students 
taking out a HELP loan, there is the potential for significant 
numbers of recent graduate HELP debtors to be overseas for an 
extended period.47  
The Beyond Graduation Survey cannot tell us about the longer-
term locations of graduates who are still overseas after three 
years. Chapman and Higgins used migration data to better 
understand long-term movements. The data do not show 
education levels but they can identify the general demographic 
group most likely to include HELP debtors. The researchers found 
                                            
45 ATO (2013j), p. 23 
46 Chapman and Higgins (2013), table 3, scenario 2 is used. They used the 
Department  of  Immigration’s  Travellers’  Characteristics  Database  to  make  this  
estimate.  
47 Department of Education (2013b) and preceding years, table 5.1 and award 
course completions. The proportion of people paying up-front has declined from 
22.5 per cent in 2005 to 16.4 per cent in 2012.  
that a third of Australian citizens aged between 20 and 30 (the 
main HELP repayment years) who left Australia long-term in 2004 
were still away after six years.48 While some will return, the longer 
they remain away the more their careers and personal lives will 
keep them overseas, making it less likely that they will ever repay.  
The  international  nature  of  Australia’s  domestic  students  may  
contribute to this emigration. In 2012, 22 per cent of domestic 
students were born overseas.49 Migration data shows that 
overseas-born Australians make up 27 per cent of the population 
but 35 per cent of all long-term departures of Australian citizens.50 
Migration not working out, family pressures to return to the 
country of birth, increased opportunities from being multilingual 
and work rights in home countries may all contribute to this 
phenomenon. Since 2002, Australia has allowed dual citizenship, 
which means more migrants retain full legal rights in their country 
of birth.  
3.5 VET-FEE HELP 
The Vocational Education and Training (VET) FEE-HELP scheme 
was established in 2009, as an extension to the FEE-HELP 
scheme. It provides income contingent loans to students 
undertaking diploma, advanced diploma, graduate certificate and 
graduate diploma courses with an approved VET provider.51  
                                            
48 Chapman and Higgins (2013), p. 289 
49 Department of Education (2013b), table 9.1 
50 DIAC (2013), p. 103 
51 Department of Innovation (2009-2011). Vocational education graduate 
certificate and graduate diploma courses were removed from the Australian 
Qualifications Framework in 2013: AQF (2013) 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 21 
Since the introduction of VET FEE-HELP, the number of eligible 
students has grown more than threefold, from 19,273 students in 
2009 to almost 70,000 in 2011. The take-up rate on loans has 
increased from 27 to 56 per cent over the same period. 
Consequently, the number of students with a loan has increased 
more than sevenfold.52 
Doubtful debt is the amount of debt not expected to be repaid 
from all HELP schemes, including HECS-HELP, FEE-HELP, 
VET FEE-HELP, OS-HELP, and SA-HELP. As VET FEE-HELP is 
recent it does not yet account for a large portion of existing 
doubtful debt. But VET FEE-HELP assisted students are expected 
to triple by 2016–17.53 
People with vocational education diploma or advanced diploma 
qualifications are less likely to repay HELP debt than are higher 
education graduates.54 Using Census 2011 data, Figure 10 shows 
that the income distribution of people with diplomas is skewed 
towards the lower income range, compared with bachelor 
graduates. More than half of people with diplomas aged 20 to 39 
earn less the repayment threshold. They are 50 per cent less 
likely than higher education graduates to make a repayment.55  
                                            
52 Department of Innovation (2009-2011) 
53 DIICCSRTE (2013c) 
54 Although there are also higher education diplomas, they are only a small 
percentage of all diploma students: NCVER (2013), table 4. In higher education, 
students often take diploma courses as a pathway to a bachelor degree course, 
or in combination with a bachelor degree. They will therefore not show in the 
Census,  which  asks  only  about  a  person’s  highest  qualification.   
55 Assuming a uniform distribution of population within each census income 
range and most repayment occurring between the ages of 20 and 39. 
Figure 10: Income distribution of 20–39 years olds with diploma or 
bachelor qualifications, 2001–2011 
 
Note:  Income represents annual income derived from weekly earnings.  
Source: Census 2011 
Since a snapshot of income at a particular time can over-
represent temporary factors, HILDA, a longitudinal survey 
spanning more than 11 years, is also used to check the results. 
HILDA data show that 13 per cent of vocational education diploma 
holders earn less than the repayment threshold for 11 years, 
which is twice the level of higher education graduates, as Figure 
11 shows. 
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Figure 11: Proportion of higher education graduates and diploma & 
advanced diploma holders by number of years of below the 
repayment threshold income, 2011 
 
Notes: Higher education degree includes postgraduate, bachelor, graduate diploma and 
graduate certificate. The data includes people who were Australian citizens in 
2011 and obtained qualification prior to 2001. It excludes people below 24 or 
above 54 years old and people who are still studying. 
Source: HILDA (2011) 
As in higher education, women with diplomas or advanced 
diplomas have worse repayment prospects than their male 
counterparts. This is particularly important for VET FEE-HELP  
since more than 69 per cent of students who borrowed in 2012 
were women.56  
The fact that people with diploma qualifications are less likely to 
work full-time than are higher education graduates reduces their 
repayment prospects. While most full-time jobs pay more than the 
repayment threshold, less than 20 per cent of part-time jobs do, 
as section 3.2 discusses. Of 20 to 39-year olds with diplomas or 
advanced diplomas, 40 per cent were not working full-time in 
2011, as Figure 12 shows. They are 11 per cent less likely to be 
in full-time work than are their higher education counterparts. 
                                            
56 Department of Education (2013d) 
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Figure 12: Labour force participation status of higher education 
and diploma & advanced diploma holders, aged 20–39, 2011 
 
 
Notes: Higher education degree includes postgraduate and bachelor. The data includes 
graduates who were Australian citizens in 2011. It excludes people who are still 
studying. 
Source: ABS, Census 2011 
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4. Changing the repayment threshold  
The current initial HELP repayment threshold is $51,309. 
Everyone earning less repays nothing; everyone earning more 
pays at least 4 per cent of their annual income, or $2,050 a year 
or more.57 Anyone persistently earning slightly above the 
threshold will repay over 10 to 15 years, on average. Anyone 
persistently earning less than the initial threshold never repays his 
or her HELP debt.  
This chapter outlines the rationale behind the original repayment 
threshold and its indexing method, and issues involved in 
changing them. It also investigates the possible savings from 
changing the threshold and the indexation system. 
4.1 Basis of the initial threshold 
The current initial threshold incorporates two concepts that 
originate in the report of the Wran Committee, which in 1988 
recommended introduction of the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme, HECS. The committee  thought  that  people  with  “little  or  
no  capacity  to  pay”  should  not  do  so. That included people who 
were unemployed, in low-paid employment, on welfare or out of 
the workforce for child rearing.58  
The $51,309 threshold is set more than high enough to meet this 
condition. Raised in 2004–05 to improve the financial position of 
graduates on lower incomes, the threshold exceeds other 
                                            
57 HELP debtors can pay up to 8 per cent of their total income: see ATO (2013e). 
58 Wran (1988), p. 57 
government indicators of financial need.59 For example, a part 
aged pension is paid to people with incomes below $48,000.60 
The annual minimum wage is $32,354.61 A threshold based on 
that figure is the lowest  possible  amount  consistent  with  a  “little  or  
no capacity  to  pay”  principle.  On  that  basis, the threshold would 
be $33,700 once a 4 per cent repayment was factored in.  
Despite suggesting a “capacity  to  pay”  principle,  the Wran 
Committee proposed basing the threshold on average weekly 
earnings (AWE) for all full- and part-time employees, which would 
put it well above low-paid employment. AWE is influenced by the 
wages of highly-paid managers and professionals, who are a 
growing proportion of all wage earners.62 The Wran report itself 
noted that AWE positioned graduates favourably in the overall 
income distribution.63  
In practice AWE is only partly used to set the threshold for 
repayment. The current threshold is $3,600 less than AWE, but 
                                            
59 On why the threshold was increased: Nelson (2003), p. 21. 
60 DHS (2014), p. 35. Calculated by multiplying the fortnightly maximum income 
by 26. 
61 Fair Work Commission (2013). Calculated by multiplying the weekly minimum 
wage for a 38 hour week by 52. The Commission is required to take the needs of 
the low paid into account in setting the minimum wage.  
62 For example, the proportion of all employed persons who are professionals 
has increased from 17 per cent in 1996 to 22 per cent in 2013: ABS (2013f). 
However this compositional shift has been offset by an increase in part-time 
work from 25 per cent to 30 per cent of employees: ABS (2013e). 
63 Wran (1988), p. 57 
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indexed according to an AWE-based formula.64 As AWE typically 
grows by more than inflation, the threshold is rising in real terms. 
AWE indexation means that the threshold incorporates a relative 
measure  to  preserve  graduates’  financial  position  compared to 
other people. It is more generous than most other programs 
offering government financial assistance. The benefits of most 
people receiving government support start reducing at lower 
amounts than $51,309. Major benefits such as the Newstart 
Allowance and the Family Tax Benefit are indexed to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).65  
The AWE influence is consistent with the role of income 
contingent loans in smoothing income  over  a  graduate’s  lifetime. It 
puts more repayments into later periods of relative affluence. If 
there were no cost to government in lending to HELP debtors, this 
income smoothing would be unproblematic. It would make 
graduates in their early adult years better off without making 
anyone else worse off. However, a high HELP threshold brings 
costs. It increases the risk that debt will not be repaid.  
4.2 Other considerations in changing the threshold 
Ideally, HELP repayment rules should be consistent over time. 
Stable rules allow debtors to plan their finances. With large cuts to 
the threshold, some students working while studying may 
unexpectedly have to start repaying before completing their 
                                            
64 The  series  is  called  ‘total  earnings’  which  includes  all  workers,  both  part-time 
and full-time: ABS (2013a). The threshold would have been $54,917 in 2013-14 
if based entirely on AWE.  
65 Department of Social Services (2012); Department of Human Services 
(2013c); Department of Human Services (2013b) 
qualification. People with HELP debt may have made financial 
commitments based on the higher threshold.  
Prospective students may decide against further education if a 
lower threshold exposes them to additional costs or risks. This 
would undermine one goal of HELP, which is to encourage people 
to undertake further study.  
In the history of HECS and HELP, we have one major experiment 
in decreasing the threshold. From the 1997–98 financial year the 
initial threshold was cut from $28,495 to $20,701, with AWE 
indexation. This lasted until 2004–05, when an increased base 
threshold was introduced. After the change was announced in 
1996, there did appear to be an ‘announcement  effect’  with  school 
students’  stated intentions to pursue higher education temporarily 
declining.66 Actual school leaver demand for higher education as 
measured in applications through tertiary admissions centres is 
harder to interpret. The historical data is consistent with a small 
decline in applications as a share of the relevant age cohort from 
1997.67 Because the threshold change coincided with a large 
increase in HECS charges, it is impossible to say whether the 
reduced threshold or the total price caused the fall in demand.  
                                            
66 Chapman and Ryan (2005); the study followed the same group of students at 
age 14 and 15 in 1995 through to 1998. At the end of each year, the students 
were asked about their intention to attend university. After the 1996 
announcement of higher HECS charges and a lower threshold, university 
intentions temporarily dropped across students from all wealth levels. The effect 
was largest in the higher wealth groups.  
67 Using data from AVCC (2003) and ABS (2008b). However, applications were 
not recorded precisely by age.  
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Mature age students are more vulnerable to threshold changes 
than school leavers. Older students are more likely to already 
have incomes in the range of potential lower thresholds.68 Many of 
them would have pre-existing financial commitments that 
constrain their capacity to take on new expenses. Consistent with 
these observations, after the 1997–98 threshold cut was 
announced applications from people aged 21 or over declined and 
took years to recover.69 Higher HECS rates and fewer people in 
their early 20s may also have contributed to reduced demand, so 
it is not clear what effect the lower threshold had.70   
Another factor to consider is the interaction between the threshold 
and other government programs. Many graduates receive 
government benefits, especially relating to family support. The 
income tests applying to these benefits are arguably analogous to 
the hardship indicators identified by the Wran Committee. For 
example, full Family Tax Benefit Part A is available if household 
income does not exceed $48,837.71 The government may not 
want HELP repayments to reduce the income of parents it 
otherwise deems deserving of full family benefits.  
4.3 Savings from changing the threshold  
The considerations count against large cuts to the initial 
repayment threshold. However ATO data suggests that these 
would be needed to make a significant short-term difference to 
                                            
68 For example, at the time of the 2011 Census 17 per cent of 25 to 39 year old 
students had annual incomes between $31,200 and $51,999, compared to 8 per 
cent of 20 to 24 year olds, and 2 per cent of those aged less than 20. 
69 Norton (2012a), p. 75 
70 ABS (2008a), table 4.1 
71 Department of Human Services (2013a).   
repayments.72 The most recent available data is for the 2010-11 
financial year, in which 1.57 million people had an outstanding 
HELP debt.73  
The incomes of HELP debtors are spread over a wide range, as 
Figure 13 shows. The number of people earning slightly less than 
the threshold in 2010–11 is perhaps surprisingly small. A $1,000 
reduction in the threshold would have increased the number of 
repaying debtors by only 15,000 people, or one per cent of total 
debtors.74 It would only have raised $26 million, as seen in Figure 
14. Reducing the threshold to the 2010–11 minimum wage of 
$30,644 would have raised about $300 million in additional 
repayments.75 It would have added 19 per cent to the $1.57 billion 
the Government collected in that year.76 However, it would also 
have undermined some of HELP’s policy objectives.  
 
                                            
72 One per cent sample file from the ATO. 
73 ATO (2013i) 
74 There are very high repayment changes when crossing a threshold, as HELP 
debtors must pay 4 per cent of all their income, not the income above the 
threshold. This creates an incentive to keep income below the threshold. 
However, there is little evidence that this is occurring: Chapman and Leigh 
(2009) 
75 Fair Work Ombudsman (2011) 
76 Amount received including compulsory and voluntary repayments in 2010-11: 
ATO (2011), p. 66 
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Figure 13: Additional annual repaying HELP debtors, 2010-11 
 
Source:  ATO (2013a) 
 
Figure 14: Additional annual repayments from lower thresholds, 
2010-11 
 
Note:  A 4 per cent marginal rate is used to calculate the extra repayments. We 
assumed that additional repaying debtors have at least 4 per cent of their income 
in outstanding HELP debt. 
Source:  ATO (2013a) 
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4.4 The effects of indexation 
In the original  framework  of  HECS,  HELP’s  predecessor, the 
repayment threshold was indexed to CPI movement. Since 1994, 
the indexation system has followed the movement in average 
weekly earnings of all employees.77 
Over the long run, indexation systems can have a significant 
impact on the threshold. Figure 15 shows other potential 
repayment thresholds, depending on how they are calculated. If 
AWE had been used to index the 1989 threshold and kept until 
today, the 2013–14 threshold would be $59,772 — more than 
$8,000 above the current figure. By contrast, if the CPI were used, 
the threshold would be $47,379, $3,930 below the current figure. 
Finally, if the 1997–98 change to the threshold had been kept and 
indexation had followed the movement of the CPI, the threshold 
would be $31,440, almost $20,000 below the current threshold.    
Because the HELP threshold is indexed to AWE rather than to the 
CPI, it is increasing in real terms. On average since 1996 AWE 
have grown at 4.1 per cent a year. The CPI has grown at 2.6 per 
cent a year.78 If the threshold had been indexed to CPI after it was 
increased in 2004–05, the current level would be $44,836 rather 
than $51,309.  
                                            
77 Australian Government (1988-2013); Australian Government (1993); 
Australian Government (2003); as part of the Higher Education Funding 
Legislation Amendment Act 1993.  
78 ABS (2013a); ABS (2013b) 
Figure 15: Potential threshold using different historical bases and 
indexation systems, 2013-14 
 
Note: The threshold shown represents the initial threshold where the marginal rate is 4 
per cent.  
Sources:   ABS (1994-2013); ABS (2013b); Higher Education Funding Act 1988 from 
multiple compilations, and Higher Education Support Act 2003 
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benefits, ideally the threshold should be coordinated with these 
entitlements.  
None of these concerns stand in the way of CPI indexation. This 
would maintain the real value of the threshold while, over time, 
increasing HELP repayment revenues. If CPI indexation had been 
used since 2004–05 it would have increased repayment revenues 
by 5 per cent or $83 million in 2010–11, on top of the $1.57 billion 
actually received (Figure 16).79 Using analysis based on the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) 
survey, we estimate that 29 per cent of the $83 million would have 
been reduced doubtful debt, while 71 per cent would have brought 
forward repayments that would eventually have occurred anyway. 
If indexation to CPI had been adopted in 2004–05, the 
accumulated extra repayment would have been $257 million over 
the seven years to 2010–11. Using the HILDA survey, we 
estimate that $73.4 million of this amount would have been 
reduced doubtful debt, and $183.3 million early repayment.  
These estimates are conservative, as they only include money 
from people who would not otherwise make an annual repayment. 
In practice, indexation affects 10 different income thresholds from 
the initial $51,309 through to $95,288. At each threshold, the 
debtors have to repay an extra half percentage point of their total 
income, up to eight per cent. With CPI indexation, graduates on 
higher incomes will repay more quickly than they do now. Speed 
matters, because faster repayments increase the chance of all 
debt being cleared before HELP debtors leave the full-time 
workforce (section 3.2). 
                                            
79 2010-11 is the latest year for which we have ATO unit record data.  
Figure 16: Additional repayment if the repayment threshold is set at 
2004-05 policy change with CPI indexing 
 
Notes:  A 4 per cent marginal rate is used to calculate the extra repayments. Due to data 
limitations, we assumed that additional repaying debtors have at least 4 per cent 
of their income in outstanding HELP debt. More repayment could be expected if 
higher repayment thresholds were also indexed to CPI. 
Source:  ATO (2013a) 
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million in extra repayments by 30 June 2017. Of this, $64 million 
would otherwise be doubtful debt.80  
For these reasons, the threshold should be indexed to CPI. The 
change can be readily defended as consistent with the original 
goals of HELP. It will preserve current levels of income smoothing 
and risk management, and hence is unlikely to affect demand for 
higher education. At the same time, it will reduce doubtful debt 
and speed up the repayment of other HELP debtors.  
 
  
                                            
80 In $2016-17; HILDA (2011); ABS (2013b); Treasury (2013c); Treasury 
(2013a); DIISRTE (various years); Communication with the Department of 
Education 
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5. Collection of HELP from overseas debtors
HELP debtors working overseas are not obliged to repay their 
HELP debts. There is no reason for this in principle. The 
challenge is to design a cost-effective repayment system.  
This chapter investigates existing measures to avoid losses from 
overseas  HELP  debtors  and  other  countries’  experience.  It  
evaluates different ways of reducing doubtful debt caused by 
overseas debtors. 
5.1 Existing measures to protect against loss of HELP 
overseas 
Higher education funding legislation does not specifically exempt 
HELP debtors working overseas from repaying. Overseas debtors 
not repaying is a by-product of the chosen repayment mechanism 
— the Australian tax system. Anyone not paying income tax in 
Australia does not incur a HELP repayment obligation.  
Although existing legislation does not require repayment from 
people overseas, it recognises the problem. New Zealanders and 
Australian permanent residents are entitled to a Commonwealth-
supported place in an Australian university, but not a HELP loan.81 
Since their foreign citizenship means that they can easily move 
back home and avoid repaying their HELP debt, their exclusion 
from HELP represents a measure to minimise the overseas 
debtors problem.  
                                            
81 Higher Education Support Act 2003, sections 36-10(2), 90-5 and 104-5. HELP 
eligibility for New Zealand-born long-term residents of Australia has been 
announced but not legislated.  
For similar reasons, Australian citizens cannot get HELP loans for 
courses taken primarily at the overseas campuses of Australian 
universities.82 As of 2011, Australian universities had 12 overseas 
branch campuses offering full-degree programs.83 Australian 
citizens are also ineligible for HELP loans if their higher education 
provider believes they will not undertake any subjects in 
Australia.84 This provision prevents Australians living overseas 
from borrowing under HELP to take online courses. Studying 
overseas indicates a capacity and perhaps an intention to stay 
away from Australia, and reduces the likelihood that these 
students will repay their HELP debt.  
However, nothing stops HELP debtors studying in Australia and 
then moving overseas.  
5.2 The overseas experience 
England and New Zealand both have income contingent loan 
schemes modelled on HELP. Each has measures to collect from 
overseas debtors, recognising the problem that permanent and 
long-term migration pose for tax-based repayment systems.  
In England, people from other European Union countries can take 
out student loans, and British citizens have work rights in other 
EU countries. Despite the potential for large-scale emigration after 
                                            
82 HESA 2003, sections 90-10 and 104-1(2) 
83 Lawton and Katsomitros (2012), p. 37 
84 HESA 2003, sections 90-5(3) and 104-5(3) 
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study, only three per cent of student debtors with known 
addresses reside overseas, according to official statistics.85  
England maintains the income contingent repayment system for 
overseas student debtors.86 Thresholds for repayment vary 
according to country, allowing graduates to match the living 
standard of debtors in England. Debtors to the English Student 
Loan Company (SLC) living in Australia have a threshold for 
repayment equivalent to A$41,000, and have to pay 9 per cent of 
their income above the threshold.87 
This income contingent method of overseas debtor repayment 
involves significant paperwork. Overseas debtors need to send 
the SLC documentary evidence — such as photocopies of 
payslips and bank statements — of how much they earn. Debtors 
who are not working need to show, through a letter from a parent 
or another third party, for example, how they support themselves. 
A default monthly repayment amount applies to debtors who do 
not submit income evidence. It is equivalent to $615 for debtors in 
Australia.  
The SLC can apply penalty charges to debtors who do not meet 
their obligations, require repayment of the loan in full, and charge 
for the cost of collecting the debt.88 Despite these enforcement 
measures a quarter of overseas resident debtors were in default 
                                            
85 Two per cent of debtors have unknown status; Student Loan Company 
(2013a), calculated from table 1A(i) for 2012 cohort.  
86 Graduates are deemed to be overseas for repayment purposes if they are 
away for three months or more.  
87 Student Loan Company (2013b). Currency conversion 1 December 2013. A 
higher threshold will apply for loans taken out from late 2012.  
88 Student Finance England (2013), p. 19 
as of April 2013. A third were repaying, with the rest earning less 
than the income threshold.89 
Overseas student debtors are a major issue in New Zealand. 
Twenty-seven per cent of the people who graduated in 2004 had 
spent six months or more overseas by 2010.90 In 2013, 15 per 
cent of all student loan debtors were overseas.91 For New 
Zealanders, easy access to the Australian labour market means 
that many graduates spend time working overseas. Finding an 
effective way of collecting from overseas student loan debtors has 
been a significant policy challenge.  
Compared to the complex English system, New Zealand 
minimises management costs by charging overseas graduates flat 
annual amounts based on outstanding debt levels..92 The 
repayment amount ranges from A$900 for small loan balances to 
a maximum of A$4,600 a year on balances exceeding 
$A55,000.93  
Flat amounts make the repayment system simpler, but sacrifice 
income contingency. New Zealand student debtors pay 12 per 
cent of their income above $A18,000, so some overseas 
graduates could pay more in a flat amount than they would at 
home under income contingency. However, many others would 
                                            
89 Student Loan Company (2013a), table 1 
90 Smyth and Spackman (2012), p. 30 
91 Ministry of Education (NZ) (2013), data appendix, table 28. After a period of 
residency in New Zealand, recently increased to three years, Australian citizens 
can also take out New Zealand loans: Doyle (2013). This further increases the 
risk of graduates leaving the country.  
92Graduates are deemed to be overseas for repayment purposes if they are 
away for more than six months, although they can apply for a one-year 
‘repayment  holiday’.   
93 Inland Revenue (2014), Currency conversion 4 April 2014.  
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pay less with the flat amount than under the income contingent 
system.  
Although New Zealand has always required overseas student 
debtors to repay, policies have changed over the years. A now-
abolished three-year repayment holiday for overseas debtors 
exacerbated repayment problems. New Zealand is finding that it is 
difficult to get debtors into repayments after such a long break.94  
New Zealand uses advertising to alert overseas student debtors 
to their obligations and debt collectors to improve repayment 
levels.95 They data-match passports and tax records to increase 
compliance from debtors returning to New Zealand. Yet despite 
increasing amounts of repayment from overseas student debtors, 
60 per cent of them still have overdue payments.96  
In the latest move to increase repayment rates, the New Zealand 
Parliament has passed a law allowing authorities to arrest 
defaulting student loan debtors at airports.97 This will catch people 
living permanently outside New Zealand who return temporarily 
on business or to see friends and family.  
5.3 Recovering HELP from overseas  
In principle, overseas HELP debtors should repay. The original 
idea behind HECS was that students contribute to the cost of their 
education when their income reaches a threshold. HELP debtors 
who leave Australia permanently are not doing so. Requiring 
repayment from overseas HELP debtors would treat all debtors 
fairly, rather than allowing some to escape their obligations.  
                                            
94 Ministry of Education (NZ) (2013), p. 35 
95 Ibid., p. 36 
96 Ibid., comparing data appendix tables 28 and 34.  
97 New Zealand Parliament (2013) 
However, getting HELP debtors overseas to repay would not be 
straightforward. The English and New Zealand experience 
suggests that the degree of non-compliance would be significant. 
This is despite those two countries making it clear to loan 
applicants that they must repay regardless of location, and taking 
extensive steps to keep  track  of  debtors’  locations  overseas.   
Australia would start well behind England and New Zealand in 
implementing an international repayment policy. We do not know 
how many HELP debtors are overseas, or possess their contact 
information. The mere task of informing HELP debtors of their 
obligations would create major difficulties for the ATO.  
Income contingent HELP collection overseas would also require 
setting thresholds in foreign currencies. Debtors would have to 
prove how much they earned and the government would need 
new bureaucratic systems to verify foreign income and calculate 
repayments. The question then is whether there are simpler and 
more cost-effective ways to collect HELP debt from overseas. 
5.4 International agreements for overseas HELP collection 
Tax treaties have occasionally been suggested as a way of 
getting HELP debtors overseas to repay their debt. Although 
HELP repayments are not taxes, tax systems allow efficient 
collection of income contingent loans. Treaties allow countries to 
exchange tax and income information, and in certain cases assist 
tax collection for another country. Australia currently has income 
tax treaties with 46 countries. It also has tax information exchange 
agreements with 36 other countries.98 It has mutual obligations to 
assist in tax collection with New Zealand, Norway, and South 
Africa.99 Under a tax treaty, countries could also collect each 
                                            
98 Treasury (2013b) 
99 Treasury (2008), no. 17; ATO (2013b); ATO (2013c) 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 34 
other’s  student  debt  repayments.  As  with  using  local  tax  agencies,  
this would make use of existing income information, collection 
systems and enforcement mechanisms.  
Australia recently took the first steps towards an international 
agreement on student debt collection. When New Zealand Prime 
Minister John Key visited Australia in February, a joint statement 
announced that Australia would provide information to New 
Zealand to help them recoup unpaid student loans. It also stated 
that New Zealand would reciprocate if Australia decided to require 
its overseas HELP debtors to repay.100 
Yet while these bilateral agreements may be useful, they are 
unlikely to do more than complement other repayment systems. 
Agreements would be needed with the countries where overseas 
HELP debtors are living. Figure 17 shows the top seven overseas 
destinations for recent graduates of Australian universities. Of the 
seven, the UK and New Zealand would have the most interest in 
reciprocal arrangements with Australia. They have income 
contingent loans and problems with overseas repayments.  
It is much less clear what benefit the other five major destination 
countries would see in a student debt collection treaty with 
Australia. They have other ways of financing higher education 
students and recovering student debt. Agreements covering the 
destination countries of less than 30 per cent of recent overseas 
HELP debtors would still leave a significant repayment problem.  
Even for Australia, a tax treaty to collect repayment for other 
countries could create high costs relative to revenues. There 
would be significant work in identifying foreign student debtors, 
applying  different  repayment  rules  to  Australia’s,  and  making  sure  
no more money was collected than owed. Given the lopsided 
                                            
100 Abbott (2014) 
patterns of Australia–New Zealand migration, a cross-Tasman tax 
treaty could mean significant bureaucratic effort in Australia to 
collect debts owed to New Zealand with only limited additional 
HELP revenue in return.  
We need a repayment system that can collect from debtors in 
many different countries at a low administrative cost.  
Figure 17: Top destinations for working Australian graduates, 2012 
 
Notes:  The data contains a sample of 466 graduates from the end of 2008. It only 
includes Australian citizens and permanent residents who were working 
overseas (part and full time) in 2012.The results for 2011 do not differ 
significantly. Japan was part of the top 7 in 2011 rather than Singapore. 
Source:  GCA (2012) 
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
U.K. U.S Singapore Canada Hong 
Kong 
New 
Zealand 
China 
Proportion of overseas working graduates (per cent), 2012 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 35 
5.5 Overseas debtors collection method for new debt 
The most feasible method of collecting overseas HELP debt is to 
require a minimum annual repayment, as New Zealand does. 
Chapman and Higgins suggest requiring HELP debtors planning 
to leave Australia for 6 months or more to repay a flat annual 
amount.101 The sum could be linked to the minimum amount 
required of debtors earning at the threshold for repayment, 
rounded up to the nearest $100 for simplicity. For 2013–14, this 
would be $2,100.  
Where debtors comply there would be relatively little extra work 
for them or the ATO. The ATO would not need to record or 
monitor foreign income. Overseas debtors would not be required 
to document their income or calculate how much they owe. 
Debtors could pay from overseas using existing provisions for 
online payment. The amount would be deducted from their 
outstanding HELP balance as if they were in Australia. 
Only limited exemptions should be made to this repayment 
requirement. These should be provable with simple evidence, and 
with a good reason provided for being overseas. Full-time 
postgraduate study at an overseas university would qualify. 
Prolonged international travel would not. HELP repayment would 
have to be taken into account in budgeting for travel. Debtors can 
return to Australia if their income is low and they do not want to 
pay the $2,100 charge. The ATO would retain its discretion to 
delay repayment when enforcing the obligation would cause 
extreme hardship.102 
The  ATO’s  main  bureaucratic  difficulties would be monitoring who 
is overseas and enforcing repayments. HELP debtors would have 
                                            
101 Chapman and Higgins (2013), p. 295 
102 ATO (2013d) 
to notify the ATO of their overseas contact details if they plan to 
leave Australia for six months or more. Penalty fees could be 
imposed on debtors who fail to do so. As in New Zealand, data 
matching could be used to check on the movements of people the 
ATO suspects are overseas. Penalty interest could be imposed on 
the debt of people who default.  
If overseas HELP debtors do not meet their repayment 
obligations, the standard tax compliance model could be adopted. 
In the first instance debt collectors could be used to chase 
repayment. Travel restrictions on Australian passports could be 
imposed. Court action could be used against long-term 
defaulters.103 Some countries recognise Australian court 
judgments against debtors in default.104 However, separate legal 
proceedings would be required in other countries. Court costs 
make it uneconomical to take legal action to recover small debts. 
This problem could be overcome by requiring payment of the 
whole debt in some circumstances, as can happen in England.  
5.6 Prospective or retrospective recovery? 
Requiring HELP repayments from overseas debtors does not in 
itself raise any major issues of principle. Students have never 
been promised that leaving Australia exempts them from 
repayment. Not collecting HELP repayments from overseas has 
nothing to do with the income smoothing or risk management 
objectives  of  HELP.  It  was  a  “design  fault”  of  the  original  
scheme.105 Repayment from overseas debtors is fair to HELP 
                                            
103 ATO (2013f); ATO (2013h) 
104 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK) sections 2, 12 
and 13; The Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgements (Australia) Order 
1994 (UK) section 4; Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 (NZ), 
section 4 
105 Summers (2012) 
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debtors remaining in Australia and will improve HELP’s  long-term 
finances. 
However, removing income contingency for overseas repayments 
would partially depart from  HELP’s  original  design. Although low-
income HELP debtors could return to Australia to avoid repaying, 
some overseas HELP debtors on below-threshold incomes would 
have to repay the flat amount. A judgment is needed as to 
whether this approach or a high administrative burden for both 
debtors and debt collectors is preferable. On balance, this report 
favours the New Zealand approach with its lower complexity and 
compliance costs.   
When should the repayment obligation start? The HELP booklet 
that people applying for a loan must read specifically states that if 
their income is below the threshold they are not required to repay. 
HELP debtors living overseas on incomes below the threshold 
could reasonably claim they were misled. While the rules for 
government programs do change, this is undesirable when people 
may have made major decisions based on what they were told at 
the time.  
For the ATO, implementing new overseas collection of existing 
HELP debt would be difficult. Many overseas HELP debtors do 
not have any interaction with the ATO. It would be costly, and in 
some cases impossible, to inform them of their obligations. The 
English and New Zealand experience is that overseas debtors are 
not always aware of their obligations. This problem would be 
worse for Australia, given the long period in which overseas 
debtors correctly believed they were not obliged to repay. The 
belief that repayment is not necessary could take years to 
overturn.  
These considerations count against making former students liable 
for overseas HELP repayment. Instead, the scheme should be 
prospective, applying to anyone taking out a HELP debt in future. 
As in England and New Zealand, the HELP loan application 
process could clearly inform debtors of the need to notify the ATO 
if they travel overseas for more than six months, and their 
obligation to repay while they are overseas.  
5.7 Additional repayment revenues from overseas HELP 
repayment 
Estimating additional repayments from a flat annual charge for 
overseas HELP debtors is difficult. Until the scheme is 
implemented, we are unlikely to have an accurate count of how 
many HELP debtors are overseas. As section 3.3 explains, the 
two per cent of HELP debtors with unknown or overseas 
addresses is probably an under-count. We also need to make 
assumptions about how long HELP debtors stay overseas, what 
proportion never return, and the level of compliance. Appendix B 
discusses in more detail how our estimates were calculated.  
On the available information and the assumptions used, a flat 
repayment amount could provide $177 million in extra revenue if 
implemented for the period 2014-15 to 2016-17.106 In light of the 
English and New Zealand experience, this assumes 50 per cent 
compliance.107 Of this, we expect $70 million to be doubtful debt 
recovery, as Figure 18 shows.108 The rest of the money is the 
bringing forward of repayments that would have occurred anyway, 
after  the  person’s  return  to  Australia.   
 
                                            
106 In $2016-17 
107 For overseas graduates who permanently reside overseas. 
108 If CPI were also adopted to index the income threshold from 2014-15, the 
doubtful debt recovery from imposing a flat amount system on overseas debtors 
would be between $51million and $86 million. 
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Figure 18: Potential savings from flat annual repayments from 
future overseas debtors  
 
Notes: The average estimates are shown. See Appendix B: Recovery from overseas 
debtors through a flat amount system for details. 
Sources: Grattan Analysis of ABS (1994-2013); GCA (2011); (2012); Chapman and 
Higgins (2013): Treasury (2013a), table 2; Department of Education (2013a), 
table 2; DIICCSRTE (2013a), p.70; DIICCSRTE (2013c) 
The estimate is conservative since the data does not include 
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6. Ending the deceased estate debt write-off  
The main cause of high doubtful HELP debt is that it is not fully 
collected from deceased estates. Requiring HELP to be repaid 
from deceased estates would substantially reduce total doubtful 
debt.  
This chapter proposes a system of asset-contingent repayment. In 
other words, estates of HELP debtors would have to repay if their 
estates are worth equal to or greater than a threshold. The reform 
can ensure the eventual recovery of most outstanding debt, while 
protecting the estates of HELP debtors with little wealth.  
6.1 HELP’s  deceased estate debt write-off 
Writing off student debt in deceased estates was in the original 
legislation establishing HECS, but it is an unusual provision.109 
Debts are rarely discharged on death. Bank loans, credit cards, 
utility bills and other personal liabilities must be repaid from an 
estate, as must money owed to a government. Any remaining 
income tax liability has to be paid out of the deceased’s  estate, 
including any HELP repayments required that year if his or her 
earnings were above the threshold. The repayment is only on that 
year’s  earnings: all other HELP debt is written-off. This write-off 
rule is anomalous in the ordinary management of deceased 
estates.   
Every year, a small number of students and young graduates die 
from accidents and illnesses. Perhaps policymakers had these 
                                            
109 Higher Education Support Act 1988, section 77. The current provisions are in 
the Higher Education Support Act 2003, sections 137-20 and 140-40.  
cases in mind when they decided to discharge HECS debt on 
death. Fortunately, such situations are rare. As of mid-2011 fewer 
than 10,000 of the 2.7 million people who had taken out a HELP 
debt had died without repaying all their debt.110  
Figure 19 shows death rates by age and gender between 2009 
and 2011. Men are more likely to die earlier in their lives than 
women, but people of normal working age have very low death 
rates. Ninety-five per cent of women and 91 per cent of men die at 
the age of 60 or above. People with post-secondary education are 
even less likely to die early than the general population.111 HELP 
doubtful debt is principally driven by people expected to die at the 
age of 60 and above. 
Apart from repayments on any income in the last year of a 
person’s  life,  recovering HELP debt from estates is not income 
contingent. This raises the issue of whether income contingency 
is an implementation mechanism of, or the principle behind, 
HELP. Chapter 2 argues that income contingency supports the 
policy goal of smoothing income and consumption over a  person’s  
life. Once their life is over that policy goal is no longer relevant.   
                                            
110 ATO (2013j), p. 24 
111 Clarke and Leigh (2011) 
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Figure 19: Cumulative probability of people dying by age group and 
gender, 2009-2011 
 
Source: ABS (2012), table 1.9  
HELP also manages debtor risk. Some students may see the debt 
write-off as protecting their partners and children from hardship 
should they die first. However, this insurance will rarely be 
needed. As Figure 19 shows, few people die young or during the 
main child-rearing years. Partnered people earning less than the 
threshold also tend not to be their household’s  main  source  of  
income. By the ages of 35 to 50, three-quarters of these lower-
income partnered graduates are living with someone who earns 
more than the threshold. For partnered female graduates earning 
less than the threshold, 38 per cent have partners who earn more 
than $100,000 a year.112  
While the main beneficiaries of HELP debt write-offs will be the 
debtor’s  surviving  partner  and  children, usually they will not be 
financial dependants. The partner will be or have been the higher-
income earner and the children will be adults. Their additional 
inheritance through the HELP write-off will be a windfall gain. 
There is no obvious public policy purpose in granting this windfall. 
It is hard to see why the government recovers overpaid social 
security benefits from deceased estates yet writes off HELP 
debts.113 Although HELP was not designed to recover all that it 
lent, it does not need a general debt write-off. 
A more focused policy is needed for when recovering HELP debt 
from estates could cause hardship. Asset-contingent repayment 
would serve this purpose. Deceased estates worth below the 
$100,000 threshold would not be subject to repayment. But 
estates valued at or above the threshold would need to repay the 
outstanding HELP debt. If an outstanding debt is greater than the 
value of the estate above the $100,000 threshold, the remaining 
unpaid debt would be written off. The threshold should be indexed 
to CPI to maintain its real value. 
In circumstances where the asset-contingent recovery of HELP 
debt could still cause financial hardship to estate beneficiaries, the 
ATO has discretion to deal with the problem. Where repayment 
would leave dependants of the estate unable to afford food, 
accommodation, clothing, medical treatment, education and other 
                                            
112 HILDA (2011), wave 10 
113 Social Security Act 1991, part 5.4. There are some exceptions.  
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necessities, the ATO can release estates from their debt, as they 
can with other taxation debt they collect.114  
Asset contingent repayment would preserve the risk management 
aspect of HELP. It would avoid the political problem of the ATO 
recovering student debt from the small estates of deceased 
students or young graduates. Other minor estates would also be 
left untouched, protecting creditors and leaving an inheritance for 
beneficiaries.  
Asset-contingent repayment is unlikely to reduce demand for 
higher education in the main student demographic groups. The 
death write-off has never been a major selling point for HECS or 
HELP. If school leavers are aware of it, they are likely to see it as 
dealing with a small risk in the very distant future. Most will expect 
to repay during their lives, and enrol on that basis.  
Recovery from deceased estates may, however, more plausibly 
influence the decisions of older prospective students. In 2012, 
about 6,000 people aged 60 years or more were enrolled in 
HELP-eligible courses.115 This age group have poor repayment 
prospects (see, for example, the full-time work statistics in Figure 
8). Some of these people may enrol because they believe they 
will never pay. Given the relatively low public benefits from 
subsidising the education of retired compared to young people, 
making education free for them should not be a public spending 
priority. Asset-contingent repayment will help avoid the need to 
                                            
114 ATO (2013g); ATO (2013d) 
115 Department of Education (2013b), calculated from table 2.2 
put age restrictions on HELP loans, as New Zealand has done for 
some aspects of its student loan scheme.116 
6.2 Savings from ending the debt write-off for existing 
HELP debtors 
An asset-contingent threshold set at $100,000 would meet the 
policy objectives of managing risk for HELP debtors, while also 
substantially reducing HELP doubtful debt. A large proportion of 
Australians aged 60 or above have wealth exceeding $100,000, 
as Figure 20 shows.117 In 2010, 31 per cent of older Australians 
had personal wealth, such as money in bank accounts, of 
$100,000 or more. The HILDA survey does report personal 
ownership of household assets such as homes, vehicles and 
businesses. In this report we spread the value of these assets 
across household members to get pro-rata wealth, which is added 
onto personal wealth to arrive at the total wealth of a person. 
Under this approach, 81 per cent of people 60 years old or above 
had wealth of $100,000 or more, with median wealth of 
$367,000.118  
 
                                            
116 Ministry of Education (NZ) (2013), p. 67 
117 HILDA (2011) wave 10 
118 This number excludes superannuation wealth. The distribution is consistent 
with the distribution of wealth in 2006 (ibid.).  
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Figure 20: Wealth distribution of people 60 yrs. old and above, 2010 
 
Notes:  The data contains 3,138 people. Personal wealth includes bank account 
balance. Total wealth includes personal wealth and pro-rata household wealth, 
where household wealth includes business assets, investment (cash and equity), 
collectibles, home assets, trust funds, and vehicles.  
Source:  HILDA (2011) 
Our analysis uses the HILDA survey to estimate how much the 
government can expect to recover if asset-contingent recovery 
were adopted. Because HELP and its predecessor, HECS, have 
been around for only 25 years, most borrowers are below 45 
years old. The analysis is therefore not based on actual HELP 
debtors at old age. It is based on the wealth at old age of people 
with characteristics of existing HELP debtors who are not 
expected to repay.119 
As Figure 21 shows, removing the deceased estate write-off could 
reduce doubtful debt by between 27 and 67 per cent, if household 
wealth was equally distributed. Doubtful debt was $5.2 billion in 
June 2011. If asset contingent repayment at death were imposed, 
doubtful debt could be reduced by $1.4 billion if only personal 
wealth was in the estate, or $3.5 billion if an assumed share of 
household assets was also in the estate.120 
The 27 per cent recovery of HELP debt solely through personal 
wealth is a very conservative estimate. It would be true only if 
HELP debtors have no ownership of assets such as the family 
home. In practice, many couples share ownership of their home. 
As women typically live longer than men (Figure 19), they are 
likely to eventually inherit the home and other household assets. 
The evidence collected in this report suggests that women in 
couples make up a large share of those unlikely to persistently 
earn more than the threshold. Realistically, we would expect 
savings from removing the deceased estate write-off to be at the 
high end of our estimates.  
                                            
119 See Appendix A.  
120 If the repayment threshold is indexed by CPI rather than AWE, the saving 
figures are likely to be slightly smaller than shown. But we do not expect this to 
be significant since most people who did not repay have had income far below 
the proposed threshold: HILDA (2011).  
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Figure 21: Doubtful debt recovery from retrospectively imposing 
asset contingent repayment at death as of 30 June 2011 
 
  Note: See notes for Figure 20  
Sources:  HILDA (2011); ABS (2012); DIISRTE (2012a) 
6.3 Prospective or retrospective recovery? 
Recovering HELP debt from the estates of current HELP debtors 
would require retrospective amendment to the rules under which 
they took out their loans. Students who want to take out a HELP 
loan are required to read a HELP information booklet and sign a 
form agreeing to repayment in accordance with the relevant 
legislation. Until recently the booklet mentioned the death write-off 
clause.121 By contrast, there is no explicit commitment to index the 
threshold to average weekly earnings or exempt overseas HELP 
debtors from repayment.  
Under one possible interpretation of the law, students who take 
out HELP loans enter into a contract with the Commonwealth. The 
HELP booklet and form set out its terms. Under consumer law, if 
the Commonwealth is carrying on a business in lending money 
under HELP, it cannot unilaterally vary the terms of contract.122 
Ending the death write-off would do so.  
An alternative view is that there is no contract. The form students 
sign when taking out a HELP loan informs them of their statutory 
rights and obligations, not the terms of a contract. Like other 
statutory rights and obligations, these are subject to change. 
Although rule-of-law principles conflict with retrospective 
legislation, the Constitution does not prohibit it. In practice, HELP 
repayment rules have changed many times, without legal 
challenge.123 
Whatever the legal situation, retrospectively imposing HELP 
recovery would be controversial. Existing debtors may expect the 
debt write-off and complain they were misled. Some people may 
claim, albeit inaccurately, that recovery of HELP debts from 
deceased estates would be a  ‘death  duty’ (Box 1). The political 
costs would need to be measured against the gains from 
recovering additional HELP debt.  
                                            
121 The 2012 version of the booklet explicitly includes the death write-off 
condition, whereas the 2013 and 2014 do not. 
122 Australian Government (2011); section 25(1)(d) 
123 See Jackson (2003) for changes up to 2003. 
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Box 1 – Is HELP debt recovery from deceased estates a 
‘death  duty’? 
Australia has no taxes on deceased estates. Recovering HELP 
from deceased estates would not change that.  
The Australian Constitution distinguishes between taxes and fees 
for service.124 A  High  Court  case  concluded  that  a  tax  is  “…  a  
compulsory payment of moneys raised for government purposes, 
where the exactions do not constitute payment for services 
rendered….”125 
Before 2005, HECS had some tax characteristics. It was set by 
government to offset the cost of expanding the higher education 
system. In 2005 HECS was replaced with a ‘student  contribution’  
set and received by  the  student’s  university.126 
A HELP loan that finances student contributions and other fees is 
now a separate service provided by the Commonwealth to 
students. A HELP loan is not compulsory, as students can pay up-
front or take out loans from other sources. 
The tax system is used to collect HELP, but it is paying off a debt 
voluntarily incurred to pay for a specific service.  
 
                                            
124 Section 53 
125 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s  Laws  of  Australia (at 1 July 2008) 405 Taxation and 
Revenue,  ‘1  Introduction’;;  MacCormick v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 
158 CLR 622 at 638-641 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ. 
126 The maximum student contribution is set by the Commonwealth Government. 
A retrospective change to the HELP rules may prove difficult. But 
ending the automatic deceased estate write-off benefit for future 
debtors would not raise retrospectivity issues. HELP would be like 
any other kind of debt a person takes out. The value of the 
education it finances would have to be assessed against its costs, 
including a reduced estate.   
6.4 How much would removing the death write-off raise for 
new HELP lending? 
Annual HELP lending is expected to increase by 56 per cent, from 
$5.5 billion in 2012–13 to $8.6 billion in 2016–17, as Figure 22 
shows. As more is lent, the amount of doubtful debt goes up. 
Additional doubtful debt is expected to increase to $1.5 billion for 
2016-17 lending.127  
Ending the deceased estate write-off would not produce large 
cash savings in the short term. Few current students are in the 
age range when collection of remaining HELP debt would be likely 
(Figure 19). But given the way HELP is reported in the 
Commonwealth Budget, the savings would appear immediately.128 
This is because an allowance for estimated non-repayment is 
made in the year that the loans are made. 
                                            
127 Communication from the Department of Education; DIICCSRTE (2013a), 
p.70. The estimate for VET FEE-HELP lending reflects preliminary data. 
128 The immediate savings occur since the Commonwealth Government uses 
accrual accounting. It has transitioned from budgeting to an accrual framework in 
1999-2000: Treasury (1999). 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 44 
Figure 22: HELP lending and estimates of doubtful debt 
 
Notes: `e’  represents  estimates.  `p’  represents  projections.  
Sources:  Communication from the Department of Education; Treasury (2013a); 
DIICCSRTE (2013c), p. 93 
The scale of savings depends on the size of future deceased 
estates. The analysis presented in section 6.2 suggests that most 
deceased estates of HELP debtors will have wealth exceeding 
$100,000.129 Based on projections of new HELP debts, the 
accumulated savings from removing the deceased estate write-off 
over the 2014–15 to 2016–17 period would be between $1.1 
                                            
129 Based on 2010-11 estimates 
billion and $2.8 billion (Figure 23). Due to partners sharing 
ownership  of  their  home  and  inheriting  much  of  each  other’s  
wealth, the final number is likely to be towards the top of that 
range.  
Figure 23: Potential savings from removing HELP debt death write-
off for new HELP lending, 2014-15 to 2016-17 
 
Notes: `e’  represents  estimates.  `p’  represents  projections. 
Sources:  Communication from the Department of Education; HILDA (2011); Treasury 
(2013a) 
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The HELP debt deceased estate write-off has very high financial 
costs relative to its benefits. Its limited social policy objectives can 
be achieved with an asset-contingent repayment system that 
would concentrate expenditure on low-asset families. The savings 
could be re-directed to other higher education purposes, or 
returned to the Budget.  
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7. Conclusion 
Australia was the first country to use income-contingent loans to 
help students finance their higher education, with the introduction 
of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme in 1989. Since then 
the lending policies of HECS and its successor, HELP, have been 
progressively updated to meet new needs, including assisting full-
fee paying higher education students and some vocational 
education  students.  But  HELP’s  repayment  mechanisms  were  not  
designed for our current circumstances. 
The scale of borrowing under HELP is much greater than could 
have been envisaged in the late 1980s. Since then, the number of 
Australian higher education students has more than doubled. On 
average, students borrow much more now than they did then. 
When HECS was first introduced, full-time students paid $3,500 a 
year  in  today’s  money.  Now  annual  student  contributions are at 
least $6,000 a year, and up to $10,000. Full-fee students pay 
much higher fees on average, which many of them finance with 
FEE-HELP.  
On the original student numbers and borrowing levels, the 
Commonwealth could perhaps afford generous repayment 
mechanisms. Those days are gone. With other higher education 
spending being cut to reduce a Budget deficit, spending more 
than a billion dollars a year on HELP doubtful debt is not the best 
use of scarce public funds. Without any policy change, total 
doubtful debt will reach $13 billion by 2017.  
This  report  proposes  ways  of  reducing  HELP’s  costs  while  
preserving most of its income-smoothing and risk management 
attributes.  
Consistent with the original principles of HECS and HELP, 
indexing the threshold for repayment to the CPI would make the 
system less costly while ensuring that graduates are not worse off 
in real terms. The savings would be small at first but would grow 
over time. If the new index were adopted this year on all existing 
HELP debtors, the government could reduce doubtful debt by $64 
million by 2016–17. 
Once they graduate, many HELP debtors leave Australia to live 
overseas. Since the ATO has no international jurisdiction, these 
debtors are not obliged to repay their HELP debt. Income-
contingent repayment for overseas debtors would be very 
complex. This report proposes a simpler system of charging 
overseas debtors a flat amount equal to the minimum repayment 
for Australian debtors who reach the threshold: $2,100 a year in 
2013–14. If the government were to adopt the flat amount system 
in 2014–15 year, it could provide $177 million of extra repayments 
by 2016–17, of which $70 million would not otherwise be repaid. 
Many debtors are not expected to repay their HELP debt and it is 
cancelled upon death. Since most people die of old age, the debt 
write-off  is  a  windfall  for  their  estate’s  beneficiaries,  often  their  
adult children. Ending the debt write-off upon death on new HELP 
debt and replacing it with asset contingent repayment on estates 
of $100,000 or more could reduce doubtful debt significantly. The 
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accumulated savings could be up to $2.8 billion between 2014–15 
and 2016–17. 
On an annual basis, together the proposals would reduce doubtful 
debt by between $440 million and $1 billion in 2016–17. There is 
a  wide  range  because  the  HELP  debtor’s  share  of  household  
assets is uncertain. But as we believe that HELP debtors are 
likely to share in ownership of the family home and other valuable 
household assets, savings are likely to be at least $860 million in 
that year. This would reduce the anticipated 17 per cent of new 
HELP lending that is doubtful to 7 per cent.  
HELP is an important Australian policy innovation. But after a 
quarter of a century it needs some policy renovation. Changing 
the indexation of thresholds, imposing a flat amount repayment 
system on overseas debtors, and ending the automatic debt write-
off upon death are feasible and cost-effective measures. HELP 
would continue to meet its original objectives. But it would do so 
at a much lower cost to taxpayers.  
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Appendix A: Return on collecting HELP from deceased estates
Since most HELP (and HECS) debtors are below 45 years old, 
the calculation of likely assets on death cannot be based on the 
actual wealth of HELP debtors in old age. An alternative approach 
was used to estimate their wealth at death using income 
characteristics of HELP debtors, age-adjusted wealth distribution 
and  the  ABS’s  Life  Tables. 
The analysis primarily uses the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics (HILDA) survey as it contains both the wealth and 
outstanding HELP debt of individuals. To calculate the return for 
asset contingent debt recovery at death, the process is as follows: 
1. OLS regression is used to estimate the marginal effect of age 
on wealth adjusting for heterogeneity and a minor lack of 
normality. The estimate for age is also controlled for 
individual-specific and family-specific characteristics.130 The 
marginal effect of age is applied to the wealth of all 
respondents according to their age to get their age-adjusted 
wealth. 
2. For each income percentile, the corresponding age-adjusted 
wealth distribution is calculated based on the age-adjusted 
wealth, creating an income to wealth map.  
3. To obtain the income characteristics of non-repaying debtors, 
we use all HELP debtors aged above the expected age when 
                                            
130 The explanatory variables are age, age-squared, gender, education, marital 
status, health and number of children. 
an average debtor makes their last repayment.131 Using the 
current income distribution for these individuals and the 
estimated income to wealth map, we establish the likely 
wealth profile and HELP debt for each individual.  
4. The debtors who contribute to doubtful debt are categorised 
into two groups: people who are not expected to repay their 
debt fully and people who are not expected to make any 
repayments over their lifetime.132 Due to a data availability 
issue, the percentage increase in HELP loan accounts was 
used to back-cast the number of debtors in 2010–11 from 
2011–12 data. Our analysis uses the 2011 Census to 
calculate the equivalent number of people who are not 
expected to repay at all from the number of people who are 
not expected to repay fully.133 
5. The  ABS’s  Life  Tables  are  used  to  estimate  the  proportion  of  
people dying between 50 and 59 years old and 60 years old 
and above given they have lived beyond the expected 
                                            
131 Based on individual specific qualification and average repayment period 
analysis (Census 2011). Due to data availability, the sample may include debtors 
who have partially paid for their HELP debt. 
132 Data obtained from the Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, 
Science, Research and Tertiary Education  
133 We have also calculated the proportion of partial repayment using HILDA and 
the results are consistent between the two datasets. For personal wealth, the 
expected repayment is $1,405,977,330.925 using HILDA and 
$1,406,098,485.116 using the Census 2011. For total wealth, the expected 
repayment is $3,516,873,001.988 using HILDA and $3,517,176,053.746 using 
the Census 2011. 
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graduate age of 22 years old.134 Using the total number of 
debtors contributing to doubtful debt, we can calculate the 
number of debtors who are expected to die with outstanding 
HELP debt aged between 50 to 59 years old and at the age of 
60 years old and above.  
6. A wealth profile is created for each group: people of age 50 to 
59 and people of age 60 and over, age adjusted for their 
corresponding life expectancy. Based on these wealth 
profiles, the wealth distribution found in step 3 is used to 
determine the proportion of people whose income is above the 
income threshold in each group.  
7. Based on the total number of debtors who are expected to die 
in each group (50-59 years old and 60 years old and above) 
found in 5, we can find the number of people with assets 
above $100,000 in 2010–11. 
The analysis was performed on both personal wealth and total 
wealth, where personal wealth contains the net of bank account 
balances and total wealth includes the net of personal wealth and 
pro-rata household wealth, where household wealth includes 
business assets, investment (cash and equity), collectibles, home 
assets, trust funds, and vehicles.  
                                            
134 ABS (2012) 
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Appendix B: Recovery from overseas debtors through a flat amount system
Our goal is to project the amount of recovery from imposing flat 
repayment on overseas debtors during 2013–14 and 2016–17. 
For reasons discussed in chapter 5, the new repayment system 
should only be applied to new HELP debt. Since the focus of this 
report is on doubtful debt, the estimates are also found for savings 
that are related to doubtful debt (would not otherwise be 
recovered) and savings that are simply early repayments.  
The flat amounts charged to overseas debtors represent the 
minimum repayment a debtor who repays would repay. That is, 4 
per cent of the minimum threshold rounded up to the nearest 
$100. The CPI forecast and projections are used to index 
repayment threshold between 2014–15 and 2016–17.135 
First, the number of graduates with HELP debt who spend at least 
a year overseas after graduation is estimated. Using the Beyond 
Graduation Survey from 2012 (latest), the proportion of graduates 
who have HECS-HELP debt working overseas approximately one 
year after graduation was found. The average growth rate of 
student completions from 2009–2012 was used to project the 
level of student completions during 2013–2017.136 Combining the 
                                            
135 Treasury (2013a), p.1-8 
136 Since the student completion data are reported for a calendar year, rather 
than a financial year, the average of the two calendar years is used to 
approximate the number of completions for a financial year. For example, 
completions for 2013 and 2014 are combined to approximate the number of 
completions for 2013–14. 
proportion and projected completions, the number of overseas 
debtors was estimated. 
Since the flat amount would be charged each year, the number of 
years graduates who remain overseas needs to be estimated. 
Bruce Chapman and Tim Higgins analysed the Beyond 
Graduation  Survey  data  from  2010  and  the  Travellers’  
Characteristics Database of the Department of Immigration to 
predict three plausible scenarios of how long people work 
overseas. Scenario 2, which represents an average of the other 
two scenarios, was used.137 
Combining the estimates for flat amounts charged and the time 
graduates spend overseas, the amount of savings from each 
graduate cohort was found. As discussed in section 5.5, it would 
be difficult to enforce repayments for Australian graduates who 
leave Australia permanently. Our analysis assumes only half of 
the graduates who leave permanently repay.  
To determine the proportion of debt not expected to be repaid 
(DNER) of these savings, the proportion of overseas graduates 
who would not otherwise repay was estimated. Chapman and 
Higgins estimate that of the graduates who spend at least one 
year overseas, 20 per cent of them stay permanently.138  
                                            
137 Scenario 1 is based on the Beyond Graduation Survey and scenario 3 is 
based  on  the  Travellers’  Characteristics  Database. 
138 Chapman and Higgins (2013), scenario 2 
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The upper bound of repayment takes into account graduates 
overseas who return to repay their HELP debt. For graduates that 
earn above the threshold while overseas, it is assumed that they 
would also earn above the threshold locally when they return. To 
determine the proportion of graduates who earn enough to repay 
while overseas, the three years out income data of graduates 
based on the Beyond Graduation Survey 2012 was analysed.139 
For graduates who do not earn above the threshold while 
overseas, the proportion of them who return to earn below the 
threshold is estimated based on the 2010 and 2011 data from the 
Beyond Graduation Survey 2011.140 For these debtors, the flat 
repayment represents a decrease in DNER. 
 
  
                                            
139 Based on BGS 2012 
140 Data of graduates who finished their degree/s at the end of 2007 
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Appendix C: Securitisation and sale of HELP 
So far as we are aware, there are no specific offers to the 
government to buy HELP debt. However, following media reports 
the idea of securitising and selling HELP debt was put to the 
Commission of Audit.141 The value of the HELP debt is affected by 
the level of doubtful debt. This appendix explains why selling the 
HELP debt will  not  improve  the  government’s  financial  position.   
7.1 Can  securitisation  improve  the  government’s  budget? 
The securitisation and sale of HELP debt would give the 
government access to cash now by moving expected future 
revenues into the current period. In return, private investors would 
receive some or all future repayments of HELP debt.142 
The sale of HELP debt would improve the underlying cash 
balance at the expense of the future. Unless the debt can be sold 
for more than its book value it cannot improve the accrual budget 
balance sheet.  
The HELP  debt’s  face  value  is already written down from $30 
billion to $22 billion to account for debts not expect to be repaid 
and the interest subsidy as of 30 June 2013.143 To improve the 
government’s  balance  sheet,  it  would  need  to  receive  more  than  
$22 billion for the HELP debt.  
                                            
141 Ross (2013a) 
142 Securitisation is a financial practice which involves converting a pool of 
assets into tradeable securities. The term does not formally imply that the 
securities would be traded (RBA (2004)). However, it is generally assumed that 
securitisation would involve the assets being sold in the near future. 
143 DIICCSRTE (2013b), p. 245 
Realistically, however, investors would pay much less than $22 
billion for the HELP debt. Their cost of capital is higher than the 
government’s  risk-free cost. The government also uses an 
optimistic payment timeline for graduates.  
Figure 24: Realistic valuations of HELP debt as of 30 June 2013 
 
Notes:  22-yr TIBs are used (GSI035). Return on Australian shares is based on 20-yr 
average to 2011. Inflation expectation is calculated from the TIBs and TBs. 
Sources:  ASX (2012); DIISRTE (2012a); ASX (2013); CBA (2013); DIICCSRTE (2013b); 
GCA (2013); RBA (2013a) 
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As shown in figure 24, the government could expect to receive 
$14.6–15.4 billion for the HELP debt, depending on the capital 
costs of the private investors.144 It would lose between 33 and 
37 per cent  of  HELP’s  book value. This valuation takes into 
account recent and expected labour market conditions for 
graduates, the composition of courses undertaken and the gender 
of HELP debtors (see Appendix D). This estimate is consistent 
with valuations by Professor Bruce Chapman, the architect of 
HECS, Professor Scott Bowman, the Vice-Chancellor of Central 
Queensland University, and ACIL Allen Consulting on behalf of 
Universities Australia.145 
Since the offer price  is  expected  to  be  below  the  government’s  
book value, selling the HELP debt would weaken the 
government’s  long-term accrual budget balance.  
7.2 Can the government make better use of HELP 
proceeds now? 
Rodney Maddock, now a Vice-Chancellor’s  Fellow  at  Victoria 
University, suggests that securitisation is attractive as the 
government can make better use of the money now.146 Professor 
Glenn Withers agrees and suggests investment in education.147 
                                            
144 Based on A and BBB corporate bond rates 
145 Professor Chapman, Professor Bowman and a report to Universities Australia 
by ACIL Allen Consulting suggest that the government could lose 35, 30-52, and 
36 per cent of its fair value from selling HELP debt; Ross (2013a); Bowman 
(2013); ACIL Allen Consulting (2013) table A3 
146 Maddock (2013) 
147 Ross (2013b) 
The Treasurer argues that infrastructure investment is necessary 
to boost  the  economy’s  productivity.148  
Although in theory these proposals may have merit, history 
suggests that governments tend to consume windfalls. The mining 
boom contributed about $190 billion to accumulated budgets, 
most of which has been given away or consumed.149 Selling 
HELP debt would also provide the government with a windfall 
(albeit of a smaller scale). There is little reason to believe this will 
be spent more wisely than previously. 
If the government has worthwhile investment proposals selling 
HELP debt is not the only way to fund them. It can already 
efficiently raise capital through issuing bonds. Unlike a new 
market for HELP debt, the markets for Australian Treasury Bonds 
(ATB) are established, reputable, deep and efficient. The 
government has complete information about the amount of money 
it can raise and at what cost. The ATB markets do not suffer from 
liquidity premiums and have low transaction costs. For these 
reasons, ATBs are a better source of revenue for government 
investment projects.  
7.3 Can securitisation help reveal the true cost of HELP? 
One difficulty in pricing HELP debt is a lack of information about 
the repayment profiles of graduates. This is partially due to limited 
information being published by the government, but more broadly 
due to the debt not being traded in the market.  
                                            
148 Allard (2013) 
149 Minifie, et al. (2013) 
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Having access to accurate price information on HELP debt would 
help with decision-making. Figure 24 shows that the government 
overstates the value of HELP, but if HELP debt were traded on a 
market,  the  government  would  be  required  to  use  the  market’s  
cost of HELP as its book value.150   
This could help create pressures to reform HELP, and identify the 
features of HELP that are creating significant losses for taxpayers. 
The same information could inform prospective students of the 
risks associated with different types of courses and careers.  
7.4 Does securitising HELP introduce new political and 
social problems? 
Students owing sold HELP debt are not likely to be exposed to 
changing repayment conditions after the sale. Indeed, sale of the 
HELP debt would reduce this risk as private sector lenders cannot 
unilaterally change repayment conditions, while the government 
can change the law relating to repayment.  
However the government may change the rules prior to sale to 
increase the amount of money that it would receive. In this 
respect, securitisation complicates the politics of HELP reform. If 
securitisation is kept on the political agenda, we risk a perception 
that reforms are aimed at improving returns for private investors. 
History tells us that it is hard enough to reform higher education 
finances when the beneficiaries are other students or other 
government priorities. Reforms perceived to benefit private 
investors are much less likely to prove acceptable to the public.  
                                            
150 Bowman (2013) 
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Appendix D: Valuation of HELP debt 
There  are  two  reasons  to  believe  that  the  government’s  valuation  
of HELP is an overestimate of its market value. Private investors 
have higher cost of capital than the government. The government 
also uses an optimistic payment timeline for graduates. 
Since the government does not explicitly describe its calculation 
of  interest  subsidy  (known  as  ‘unexpired discount’), we cannot 
describe the issues with the calculation in detail. However, from 
the available data, the interest subsidies represent 3.5 per cent of 
non-doubtful debt loans.151 Using the 1 per cent real discount rate, 
the equivalent number of years for an average debtor to repay is 
around 4, which is significantly below our analysis based on the 
Census 2011. 
The analysis evaluates the price in which the government may 
expect to receive for selling the HELP debt as of 30 June 2013. It 
contains two parts: finding the appropriate cost of capital for HELP 
loans and predicting a credible repayment profile for the cohort of 
debtors. 
The cost of capital for HELP debt reflects its risk profile and 
therefore the risk profile of HELP debtors. Since the government 
publishes limited information about HELP debtors, multiple real 
rates are used based on various types of assets, from Treasury 
Indexed Bonds (TIB) to equity.  
                                            
151 Communication from the Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate 
Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education 
Australian Treasury Bonds (ATB) are used to represent risk-free 
assets by Australian regulators. HELP loans have volatile 
repayments so investors will require a higher yield on HELP debt 
than they do on TIBs to compensate for the increased risk of 
investing. However, HELP loan repayments will be less volatile 
than returns on equity, as the incomes of graduates are less 
variable than corporate earnings or profits.  
Grattan Institute analysis used corporate bond rates as a guide for 
the risk profiles of HELP debt and adds a liquidity premium since 
HELP debt is a new type of asset with no established 
market. Ultimately the appropriate discount rate will be affected by 
the tranches of debt the government sells.  
In calculating the coupon amount (annual repayment to private 
investors), a credible earning profile of all HELP debtors is 
required. The repayment profile of an average debtor is based on 
the analysis of HELP repayment profiles in Graduate Winners, a 
2012 Grattan Institute report.152 The analysis has been updated to 
use earnings of bachelor degree graduates from the Census 
2011.  
The analysis follows the process below. 
1. An individual repayment profile is calculated using the total 
estimates for all graduates weighted by gender. 
                                            
152 Norton (2012a) 
Doubtful debt: the rising cost of student loans 
Grattan Institute 2014 56 
2. For each cohort of graduates, individual repayment profiles 
are aggregated to estimate the total per-cohort repayment 
profiles. Repayments are assumed to end at the retirement 
age (65).  
3. To create the total repayment profile for all cohorts, repayment 
profiles are time-shifted according to the number of years 
since graduation. The repayment profiles are then added 
together weighted by the corresponding share of university 
enrolment. 
4. Since HELP loan is a new type of asset with a thin market, a 
liquidity premium of 0.20 per cent has been added to the 
discount rate. 
5. The repayment profile is based on 2011 Census data as most 
debtors graduated prior to the global financial crisis. Due to 
the softer labour market since the crisis, and expectations that 
it will deteriorate further in the coming years, an impairment is 
applied.153 The impairment is approximately $1 billion, which is 
                                            
153 Graduates of bachelor degrees entering their first full time employment 
between 2009 and 2012 experienced a weak labour market. Graduates who 
found full time work within 4 months of graduation as a proportion of graduates 
available for full time work fell from 85.2 per cent in 2008 to 76.1 per cent in 2012 
(GCA (2013)). They also received lower starting wages relative to movement in 
average weekly earnings (AWE) and wage price index (WPI), falling by 3.2 per 
cent for AWE and 1.7 per cent for WPI between 2001 and 2008 compared to 
2009 to 2012 (ABS (1994-2013); ABS (2013g); GCA (various years)). Due to the 
progressive repayment structure of HELP loans, a 1 per cent fall in average 
graduate wages will cause a larger than 1 per cent fall in HELP repayments. In 
addition, unemployment is expected to gradually rise for a year until 2015 where 
it will begin to decline (RBA (2013b), ibid.). The deterioration in labour market 
conditions is likely to suppress graduate employment and starting wages until at 
equivalent to pushing back all repayment by 1.5 years, on 
average.  
The net present value of the repayment stream is calculated using 
different discount rates inclusive of the liquidity premium.
                                                                                    
least 2015. Outstanding HELP debt includes debt for students graduating in 
2013 and partial allotments of debt for students expected to graduate in 2014, 
2015 and 2016. For these reasons, the average repayment of debtors 
graduating in 2009–2016 has been scaled to 95 per cent of the original 
repayment schedule and the repayment schedule is delayed by 6 months to 
capture the increase in non-full-time work and further study. Our analysis shows 
the soft labour market and lower expected repayments reduce the price that 
government can expect to receive by approximately $1 billion.  
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Glossary 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Asset contingent repayment Conditional repayment based on 
level of assets 
ATO Australian Taxation Office 
AWE Average weekly earnings 
Commonwealth supported place Australian Government subsidised 
enrolment at approved universities. 
Students enrolled in Commonwealth 
supported places are referred to as 
Commonwealth supported students 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
HELP debt death write-off Cancellation of HELP on death 
DNER HELP debt not expected to be repaid 
Doubtful debt HELP debt not expected to be repaid 
Face value of HELP debt Outstanding amount of HELP (and 
HECS) debt owed to the 
Commonwealth Government 
Fair value of HELP debt The  government’s  valuation  of  the  
outstanding HELP debt accounting 
for debt not expected to be repaid 
and interest costs  
FEE-HELP HELP for full-fee students 
GCA Graduate Careers Australia 
Health (other) A subset of the ABS 2-digit field 
‘Health’ that includes ‘Pharmacy’, 
‘Optical Science‘, ‘Veterinary 
Studies’, ‘Public Health’, 
‘Rehabilitation Therapy’, 
‘Radiography’  and  ‘Complementary 
Therapy’ 
HECS Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme 
HECS-HELP HELP for Commonwealth supported 
students 
HELP Higher Education Loan Program 
HILDA Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia survey 
Humanities A subset of the ABS 2-digit field 
‘Society  and  Culture’  that  includes  
‘Political  Science  and  Policy  Studies’,  
‘Studies  in  Human  Society’,  
‘Language  and  Literature’,  and  
‘Philosophy  and  Religious  Studies’ 
OS-HELP HELP for CSP students undertaking 
part of their study overseas to pay for 
a range of expenses 
SA-HELP HELP for the student amenities fee 
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Student contribution  The charge paid by Commonwealth 
supported students  
SFSS Student Financial Supplement 
Scheme 
Student Start-Up Scholarships        Lump-sum payment from 
Commonwealth to students already 
receiving income support 
Student Start-Up Loans  A proposed scheme to provide loans 
from Commonwealth to scholarship-
receivers in lieu of SSUS 
Tax treaties Bilateral and multilateral agreements 
between countries to avoid double 
taxation and tax evasion 
TB Treasury bond 
TIB Treasury indexed bond  
VET FEE-HELP HELP for students studying 
vocational education and training 
qualifications, diploma level and 
above, to pay their tuition charges 
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